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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1983, Gordon Blesi owned, by a single share, the majority of the stock in 
Blesi-Evans Company.2  Melvin Evans owned the other stock.  Prior to 1983, Blesi 
and Evans had been in business for a number of years.  The two had a falling out, 
and in 1983, Evans recovered a judgment in state court against Blesi.  The judgment 
was later amended in 1984 and provided that the company was jointly and severally 
liable with Blesi to Evans in the amount of $381,136.00.  Blesi, himself, was 
personally liable to Evans in the amount of $250,000.00.  The judgment further 
provided that the company was to remain in business for two years after which an 
evaluation was to take place.  After the evaluation, Blesi was to have the right to 
purchase Evans’s shares.  In the event that Blesi did not purchase the shares, Evans 
had the right to buy-out Blesi at the value placed on the company by an “evaluator.”3   
In July, 1984, the state court ordered the sale of some of Blesi’s shares which had 
been given in lieu of bond as security for the payment of Evans’s attorneys fees.  But 
before this sale could be accomplished, Blesi filed a petition in bankruptcy seeking 
relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Thus, the business did not continue 
for two years and the evaluation never did take place as required by the judgment.  
Practically, Evans’s right to purchase Blesi’s shares was terminated by the Chapter 7 
filing. 
If the Blesi bankruptcy had followed the usual course, there would have been a 
first meeting of creditors4 at which some cursory questions would have been asked.  
While the Blesi bankruptcy was clearly of intense concern to Evans, the bankruptcy 
trustee presiding at the first meeting of creditors was probably an “interim trustee”5 
                                                                
2See In re Blesi, 43 B.R. 45 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). 
3Id. at 46. 
411 U.S.C. § 341 (1999).  § 341 provides:  
Meetings of creditors and equity security holders  
(a)  Within a reasonable time after the order for relief in a case under this title, the 
United States trustee shall convene and preside at a meeting of creditors.   
(b)  The United States trustee may convene a meeting of any equity security 
holders.   
(c)  The court may not preside at, and may not attend, any meeting under this 
section including any final meeting of creditors.   
(d)  Prior to the conclusion of the meeting of creditors or equity security holders, 
the trustee shall orally examine the debtor to ensure that the debtor in a case under 
chapter 7 of this title is aware of-- 
(1) the potential consequences of seeking a discharge in bankruptcy, including 
the effects on credit history; 
(2) the debtor’s ability to file a petition under a different chapter of this title; 
(3) the effect of receiving a discharge of debts under this title; and 
(4) the effect of reaffirming a debt, including the debtor’s knowledge of the provisions of 
section 524(d) of this title.   
5Section 701 provides for the appointment of an interim trustee until the first meeting of 
creditors.  That section provides: 
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appointed by the United States Trustee.6  The Blesi bankruptcy was likely one of 
hundreds.  There is no reason to assume that this bankruptcy would have been given 
any special attention by the interim trustee appointed by the United States Trustee. 
As a creditor, Evans did have some remedies.  He had standing to object to 
Evans’s discharge if Blesi had violated the provisions of section 727 of the 
Bankruptcy Code in some manner.7  He also could have sought an exception from 
discharge for his claim if section 523 applied.8  Also, he probably would have been 
granted the right to conduct a thorough examination of Blesi, his assets, and his 
business dealings under Rule 2004 of the Bankruptcy Rules.9  But it is generally the 
bankruptcy trustee who controls the administration of the case and therefore decides 
how thorough the search for assets and how aggressive the estate will litigate claims. 
                                                          
Interim trustee  
(a)(1)  Promptly after the order for relief under this chapter, the United States trustee 
shall appoint one disinterested person that is a member of the panel of private trustees 
established under section 586(a)(1) of title 28 or that is serving as trustee in the case 
immediately before the order for relief under this chapter to serve as interim trustee in 
the case. 
(2)  If none of the members of such panel is willing to serve as interim trustee in 
the case, then the United States trustee may serve as interim trustee in the case. 
(b)  The service of an interim trustee under this section terminates when a trustee 
elected or designated under section 702 of this title to serve as trustee in the case 
qualifies under section 322 of this title. 
c)  An interim trustee serving under this section is a trustee in a case under this title. 
11 U.S.C. § 701 (1999).  Section 586, cited in § 701, gives to the United States Trustee the 
authority to create the panel of private trustees.  28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(1) (1999). 
6United States Trustees for the various judicial districts are appointed by the Attorney 
General of the United States.  28 U.S.C. § 581 (1999).  Among the duties of the United States 
Trustee is to “establish, maintain, and supervise a panel of private trustees that are eligible and 
available to serve as trustees in cases under chapter 7 of title 11.”  28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(1) 
(1999). 
711 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1999). 
811 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1999). 
9Rule 2004 (a) and (b) provide: 
(a) Examination on motion.  On motion of any party in interest, the court may 
order the examination of any entity. 
(b) Scope of examination.  The examination of an entity under this rule or of the 
debtor under § 343 of the Code may relate only to the acts, conduct, or property or to 
the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which may affect 
the administration of the debtor’s estate, or to the debtor’s right to a discharge. In a 
family farmer’s debt adjustment case under chapter 12, an individual’s debt 
adjustment case under chapter 13, or a reorganization case under chapter 11 of the 
Code, other than for the reorganization of a railroad, the examination may also relate 
to the operation of any business and the desirability of its continuance, the source of 
any money or property acquired or to be acquired by the debtor for purposes of 
consummating a plan and the consideration given or offered therefor, and any other 
matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan. 
FED. R. BANK. PROC. 2004(a), (b) (1999). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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Evans therefore did something which although not rare is unusual—at the 341 
meeting he moved to elect his own bankruptcy trustee.10  Section 702 of the 
Bankruptcy Code provides under stated conditions that twenty percent of the 
debtor’s creditors may request an election.11  A majority of those voting elect the 
trustee.  Since Evans’s claim constituted over ninety percent of the outstanding 
debts, it appeared that he could control the election.  Evans therefore called for an 
election and voted his ninety percent claim for Howard Malmon.12 
Blesi was not pleased with the prospect of having a bankruptcy trustee other than 
the usual standing trustee—particularly one beholden to Evans.  He therefore 
objected to the election, raising various issues.13  Evans, in turn, argued that Blesi did 
not even have standing to make an objection.14   The court eventually ruled that 
while Blesi had standing to object to Malmon’s election, the statutory objections 
were without merit.15  Thus, Evans was successful in electing Malmon the Chapter 7 
trustee. 
In our credit-driven economy, bankruptcy is becoming almost a way of life for 
failed entrepreneurs and credit card chargeaholics.  As standing trustees become 
even more inundated, it seems likely that more creditors will take a serious look at 
the option of electing their own trustee.  Elected trustees typically will serve in only 
one or, at most, a few cases.  By definition, the elected trustee enjoys the confidence 
of those who elected him.  Thus, although it is improbable that trustee elections will 
become the norm, it is anticipated that creditors will increasingly call for elections of 
trustees in Chapter 7 cases.  This article reviews prior statutes and the legislative 
history supporting 11 U.S.C. § 702, the present statute, which governs the election of 
trustees in Chapter 7 cases.16  The statute is analyzed and the procedures governing 
the election are discussed.  The article concludes by offering the authors own 
thoughts about trustee elections. 
This article offers an analysis of the election of chapter 7 trustees.  Part II the 
prior statutory scheme and the legislative history supporting the present statute.  Part 
III examines the present statute, discussing the statutory requirements for the election 
of a chapter 7 trustee.  Part IV discusses election procedures.  The bankruptcy rules 
mandate a prescribed set of procedures for elections, including procedures for 
disputing the results of an election.  These rules and the cases applying them are 
discussed in Part IV.  In Part V, appellate reviewed is examined.  This section 
                                                                
10The United States Trustee’s Office estimates that of the over 1,000,000 Chapter 7 
bankruptcies filed in 1998 a trustee was elected in less than 500 cases.  Telephone interview 
with Mr. Edward Flynn, Research Analyst, Executive Office of the United States Trustee, 
United States Department of Justice, 901 E. Street, Suite 9400, Washington, D.C. 20530. 
11See text accompanying note 39, infra, for the text of the statute. 
12In re Blesi, 43 B.R. 45, 47 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). 
13Id. at 46-47. 
14Id. at 48.  See discussion infra notes 235-247, regarding standing issue. 
15Id. at 46-48. 
16A trustee may be elected in Chapter 11 cases as well.  11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994).  See, 
e.g., In re Aspen Marine Group, Inc., 189 B.R. 859 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995).  This article is 
limited to a discussion of trustee elections in Chapter 7 cases. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss3/6
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analyzes questions such as standing and appealable orders.  Finally, in Part VI a 
proposal is offered to amend portions of the statute and supporting rules. 
II.  HISTORY 
A.  Prior Statutes 
The creditors’ right to elect the trustee extends back over a century.  The 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided that the creditors could “appoint one or three 
trustees.”  Section 44 of the 1898 act provided: 
The creditors of a bankruptcy estate shall, at their first meeting after the 
adjudication or after a vacancy has occurred in the office of trustee, or 
after an estate has been reopened, or after a composition has been set aside 
or a discharge revoked, or if there is a vacancy in the office of trustee, 
appoint one trustee or three trustees of such estate.  If the creditors do not 
appoint a trustee or trustees as herein provided, the court shall do so.17 
The reader should note that the statute is worded to assume that elections will be the 
norm.  It is only when the creditors fail to act that the court selected the trustee.18 
The voting requirements for the creditors were set forth in section 56.  That 
section provided: 
a) Creditors shall pass upon matters submitted to them at their meetings 
by a majority vote in number and amount of claims of all creditors whose 
claims have been allowed and are present, except as herein otherwise 
provided. 
b) Creditors holding claims which are secured or have priority shall not, in 
respect to such claims, be entitled to vote at creditors’ meetings nor shall 
such claims be counted in computing either the number of creditors or the 
amount of their claims, unless the amounts of such claims exceed the 
values of such securities or priorities, and then only for such excess.19 
Back in 1898, Congress established limitations on the right to vote.20  Not only 
secured creditors but also priority creditors were disenfranchised.21  But the statute 
did provide that creditors holding only partially secured claims or claims which had 
less than full priority22 status were permitted to vote to the extent that their claim was 
truly unsecured.23 
                                                                
17Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 44, 30 Stat. 557 (1898). 
18Id. 
19Id. § 56 at 560.  
20Id. 
21Id. 
22The 1898 Act did not have an elaborate priority distribution scheme, leaving priority 
issues to non-bankruptcy law. 
23Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 56, 30 Stat. 560 (1898). 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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In 1938, the act was amended to prevent relatives of the bankrupt and 
shareholders, officers, and directors of bankrupt corporations from voting.24  In 1940, 
the statute was again amended to prohibit elections when the debtor was a “face-
amount certificate company” under the Investment Company Act of 1940.25  
Therefore, the provision governing elections prior to the present statute read as 
follows: 
The creditors of a bankrupt, exclusive of the bankrupt’s relatives or, 
where the bankrupt is a corporation, exclusive of its stockholders or 
members, it officers, and the members of its board of directors or trustees 
or of similar controlling bodies, shall, at the first meeting of creditors after 
the adjudication, or after a vacancy has occurred in the office of trustee, or 
after an estate has been reopened appoint a trustee or three trustees of such 
estate.  If the creditors do not appoint a trustee or if the trustee so 
appointed fails to qualify as herein provided, the court shall make the 
appointment.  If the bankrupt is a face-amount certificate company, as 
defined in section 4 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 USCS 
§ 80a-4], the court alone shall make the appointment; but the court shall 
not make such appointment without first notifying the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and giving it an opportunity to be heard.26 
Prior to the present legislation, the bankruptcy courts had an established history of 
creditor elections.27  The right to vote, however, was tempered by preventing secured 
creditors, relatives, and corporate insiders from voting. 
B.  Legislative History to Section 702 
The reader should note that under prior statutes it was possible for a single 
creditor, holding only a small fraction of the existing claims, to appear at the first 
meeting, call for an election, and by her solitary vote, elect a trustee.  The present 
statutory scheme was enacted in 1978 after a thorough study of our bankruptcy laws 
by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.28  The 
Commission was highly critical of the possibility of a single creditor being able to 
elect the trustee where the creditor owned only a small claim.29  In the Commission’s 
view, creditors did not choose to exercise control of the bankruptcy in most cases.30  
Instead, the election procedure was subject to the control of a handful of creditors’ 
                                                                
24Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 860 (1938). 
25Act of August 22, 1940, ch. 686, Title I, § 29(b), 54 Stat. 836 (1940). 
26Id. 
27See e.g. Peerless Mfg Co., 416 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1969); Manhattan Shirt Co. v. 
Tomlinson, 327 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964). 
28See Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970) (creating the Commission).  See also 
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1 at 1-2 
(1973) (where the Commission describes its purpose and objectives). 
29Id. 
30Id. 
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attorneys, and therefore could be manipulated in an abusive manner.31  The 
Commission therefore recommended that a trustee could be elected only if thirty-five 
percent of the creditors holding allowable claims called for an election and if a 
majority of those creditors voting voted for someone other than the standing 
trustee.32 
The House generally accepted the Commission’s recommendations except the 
thirty-five percent recommendation was lowered to twenty percent.  The House 
Judiciary Committee adopted the Commission’s recommendation, proposing 
legislation largely conforming to the Commission’s language.33  The House Report is 
the most significant piece of legislative history.  The report reflects Congressional 
concern about attorneys attempting to take control of the case: 
At the first meeting of creditors, creditors will continue to have the right 
to elect a trustee of their own choice to serve in the case, subject to certain 
limitations not imposed under current law.  The bill permits creditor 
election of a trustee only in cases in which at least creditors holding 20 
percent in amount of certain scheduled unsecured claims request an 
election of a trustee.  The minimum percentage request requirement is 
designed to insure that a trustee is elected only in cases in which there is 
true creditor interest, and to discourage election of a trustee by attorneys 
for creditors, as is so often the practice under current law.  If a significant 
percentage of creditors does not wish to elect a trustee, it is unfair to 
impose the will of a few creditors’ attorneys on the rest of the creditor 
body. 
It will be more difficult under this procedure for a trustee to be elected 
unless there is actual creditor interest in the case.  In any case where there 
are significant assets, there is often creditor interest.  The problems under 
current law occur most often in cases where the return to creditors from 
the estate promises to be small.  Thus, they are uninterested, and attorneys 
can move in to control the case.  By adopting the 20 percent requirement, 
the bill discourages attorney control, but retains the idea of true creditor 
control, because the theory of creditor control remains valid.34 
                                                                
31Id. at 103-106. 
32Id., pt. 2 at 183-184. 
33See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 91-93, 95-99 (1973); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. § 702 
(1977).  The Senate Bill recommended that the Commission’s requirement that “materially 
adverse” be limited to permit creditors who hold an insubstantial equity position be permitted 
to vote.  S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 702(a)(2) (1978).  This position was adopted by the 
House.  See discussion infra note 150. 
34H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 102-103 (1978). 
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III.  THE PRESENT SCHEME 
The right to elect35 a trustee is codified in section 702 of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Section 702 was enacted into law in 1978.36  There were technical amendments in 
198237 and in 1984.38  The present section 702 reads: 
(a) A creditor may vote for a candidate for trustee only if such creditor--  
(1) holds an allowable, undisputed, fixed, liquidated, unsecured 
claim of a kind entitled to distribution under section 726(a)(2), 
726(a)(3), 726(a)(4), 752(a), 766(h), or 766(i) of this title;  
(2) does not have an interest materially adverse, other than an equity 
interest that is not substantial in relation to such creditor’s interest as 
a creditor, to the interest of creditors entitled to such distribution; 
and  
(3) is not an insider.  
                                                                
35A individual may be elected as trustee but the bankruptcy court may refuse to confirm 
the election for failure to meet other criteria.  Section 322(a) provides that trustees, including 
those “selected under section 702,” shall post a bond.  11 U.S.C. § 322(a) (1994).  See also 
FED. R. BANKR. PRAC. 2010(a) (1991), permitting an elected trustee to file a blanket bond 
where the trustee is serving in other cases. 
Trustees elected under section 702 must meet the qualifications for standing trustees.  
Courts properly reject their election even though the creditors have voted for them if they do 
not meet the qualifications.  Among those requirements is that the trustee must be “competent” 
and live or have an office in the district or adjacent district where the bankruptcy is pending.  
11 U.S.C. § 321(a)(1) (1994).  Where the elected trustee is a creditor or an attorney for a 
creditor the elected trustee “is not per se disqualified from acting as trustee, such situations 
require the Court to subject such elections to particularly close scrutiny.”  In re Brent 
Industries, 96 B.R. 193, 197 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa. 1989).  The applicable sections do not 
provide any further criteria.  There is nothing in either section 702 or any other section 
providing that the election should be overturned if the elected trustee was not “disinterested.”  
In re Greenberg, Inc., 189 B.R. 906 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (requiring that the elected trustee 
be disinterested even though section 702 has no disinterested requirement); In re Frederick 
Petroleum, 92 B.R. 273, 275-76 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (disqualifying the elected trustee for 
reasons of competence); In re Kam Kuo Seafood Corp., 42 B.R. 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), 
(failure to comply with mandates of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Martech USA, Inc., 188 B.R. 
847 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995), aff’d without opinion, 90 F.3d 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (failure to 
maintain an office in the district as required by section 321(a) of the Bankruptcy Code). 
In cases where the bankruptcy court rules that the elected trustee is not qualified, the law 
is unsettled as to whether the court should appoint the standing trustee or order a new election.  
See Martech, 188 B.R. at 852, n. 3, where the court noted the issue but declined to decide the 
question because it was not raised on appeal. 
36Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, § 702, 92 Stat. 2549, 2604 (1978). 
37Pub. L. No. 97-222, § 7, July 27, 1982, 96 Stat. 237 (1983).  This provision amended 
section 702(a)(1) to include creditors entitled to a distribution for liquidation of a brokerage. 
38Pub. L. No. 98-353, Title III, § 472, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 380 (1984). 
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(b) At the meeting of creditors held under section 341 of this title, 
creditors may elect one person to serve as trustee in the case if election of 
a trustee is requested by creditors that may vote under subsection (a) of 
this section, and that hold at least 20 percent in amount of the claims 
specified in subsection (a)(1) of this section that are held by creditors that 
may vote under subsection (a) of this section.  
(c) A candidate for trustee is elected trustee if--  
(1) creditors holding at least 20 percent in amount of the claims of a 
kind specified in subsection (a)(1) of this section that are held by 
creditors that may vote under subsection (a) of this section vote; and  
(2) such candidate receives the votes of creditors holding a majority 
in amount of claims specified in subsection (a)(1) of this section that 
are held by creditors that vote for a trustee.  
(d) If a trustee is not elected under this section, then the interim trustee 
shall serve as trustee in the case.39 
Section 702 permits an election if twenty percent of the creditors holding 
“allowable, undisputed, fixed, liquidated, unsecured claim(s)” request an election 
and a majority of those voting vote for a particular candidate.40  Those voting may 
not hold an interest which is “materially adverse” to the other unsecured creditors, 
nor may they be an insider of the debtor.41 
In this section, the specific voting requirements are analyzed.  We begin with 
subsection (b), which sets forth the initial criteria for requesting an election before 
turning to subsection (a), which sets forth the voting requirements. 
A.  Requesting An Election– Section 702(b) 
The Bankruptcy Code requires that “at least twenty percent in amount” of 
creditors holding unsecured claims request a trustee election.42  The fact that more 
than twenty percent of eligible creditors may vote for a permanent trustee does not 
cure this statutory requirement.43  Section 702(b) requires that creditors requesting an 
election also be eligible to vote for the trustee.44  Section 702(a) is therefore 
frequently relied upon in resolving an election dispute under section 702(b).45  
Section 702(a) is discussed below,46 but the reader should be aware of the connection 
                                                                
3911 U.S.C. § 702(d) (1984). 
40Id. at § 702(a)(1). 
41Id. at § 702(a)(2). 
42See supra text accompanying note 39 for the text of subsection 702(b). 
43In re Oxborrow, 913 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1990). 
4411 U.S.C. § 702(b). 
4511 U.S.C. § 702(a). 
46See infra text accompanying notes 95-191. 
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between the two subsections.  Because of the close relationship between these two 
subsections, section 702(a)’s requirements will be frequently addressed in this 
section of the article. 
While section 702(b) seems to be straightforward, it raises several issues which 
have given bankruptcy courts difficulty.  The subsection provides that twenty percent 
of the “creditors” must request the election.47  In many bankruptcies a single creditor 
holds a claim in a sufficient amount to satisfy the statutory criteria.  In using the 
word “creditors,” an ambiguity was created as to whether a single creditor should be 
permitted to elect the trustee.  The subsection is also silent as to how the “universe of 
claims” is to be determined in calculating whether the twenty percent requirement 
has been met.  Courts have been confronted with the question of whether the 
schedules, proofs of claim, or some other mechanism should be determinative in 
calculating the universe.48  Further, questions have arisen as to whether the 
unsecured portion of undersecured claims should be included in the universe.49  
1.  Single Voters 
Section 702(b) provides that “creditors may elect one person to serve as 
trustee. . . .”50  Most courts assume without discussion that a single creditor may 
effect the election of a trustee.51  In re Poage52 ruled on the question.  In that case, 
Poage filed a Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy.53  At the first meeting of creditors, 
Merrill-Lynch, which held in excess of ninety percent of the scheduled unsecured 
claims, moved for the election of a trustee.54  The interim trustee specifically argued 
“that since § 702 states that ‘creditors’ may elect a permanent trustee, Congress did 
not intend for only one creditor to be able to elect a permanent trustee.”55  The court 
rejected the argument, reasoning that voting is based on the “amount” of the claims 
as opposed to the number of claims.56 
Although the use of the plural “creditors” is unfortunate, we conclude that a 
single creditor should be able to effect the election of a Chapter 7 trustee.  
Bankruptcy Code section 102(7) does support the argument that a single creditor 
should not be able to force an election.  That section provides that “the singular 
                                                                
4711 U.S.C. § 702(b). 
48See infra text accompanying notes 62-83. 
49See infra text accompanying notes 84-95. 
5011 U.S.C. § 702(b) (1984), (emphasis added).  See supra text accompanying note 39 for 
the complete text of the section. 
51In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, 214 B.R. 852, 860 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 1997); In re 
Michelex, Ltd., 195 B.R. 993, 997 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996). 
5292 B.R. 659 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988), followed in In re Sforza, 174 B.R. 656, 658 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).  
53Id. at 661. 
54Id. at 662. 
55Id. at 663. 
56Id. at 664. 
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includes the plural.”57  There is no converse section providing that the “plural 
includes the singular,” thereby permitting the inference that when Congress used the 
plural “creditors” it did not intend to include a solitary creditor.  In other contexts, 
Congress mandated numerical requirements not only as to the amount of the claim 
but also as to the number of creditors.58  Congress required that two-thirds in amount 
and one-half in number of the claims in a class of creditors vote for a Chapter 11 
plan for that class to be deemed to have voted for the plan.59 In involuntary cases, in 
most cases there must be at least three petitioning creditors who hold claims in 
excess of $10,775.00.60  Congress’s failure to specify that at least two creditors 
request an election is evidence of Congressional intent that only one creditor is 
sufficient. 
Admittedly, permitting one creditor to effect an election and determine the 
trustee does give that creditor significant power over the administration of the estate.  
Section 702(a), which governs voting eligibility, uses the singular – “creditor.”61 
Theoretically, it is possible that more than one creditor could call for an election, 
while actually dividing the votes so that a single creditor is able to control the 
election.  In virtually every case the creditor(s) calling for the election will vote for 
the same candidate.  It makes no sense to require that more than one creditor call for 
an election to comply with section 702(b) and then allow a single creditor to 
determine the outcome of that election as is permitted by section 702(a).  Section 
702, however, does promote the right to an election, and a debtor should not be able 
to frustrate this right simply because the debtor filed a bankruptcy solely to discharge 
one debt.  The legislative history stresses that the paramount concern was attorney, 
as opposed to creditor, control of the bankruptcy case.  Permitting a single creditor 
whose claims constitute more than a majority of the outstanding claims promotes the 
objective of creditor control.  Debtors should not be permitted to schedule some 
claims only after the first meeting of creditors in an effort to defeat a single creditor’s 
rights under section 702. 
2.  Determining the Universe 
a. Use of Schedules or Some Other Mechanism 
In determining whether twenty percent of the unsecured creditors have requested 
an election, bankruptcy courts must have some mechanism for determining the total 
amount of unsecured claims.  Some courts look to the proof of claims on file before 
the section 341 meeting.62  Other courts include claims listed as undisputed on the 
                                                                
5711 U.S.C. § 102(7) (1998). 
5892 B.R. at 664. 
5911 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1998) (requiring acceptance of two-thirds in amount and one-half 
in number of the claims in a class). 
6011 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2), (2) (1998). 
61See supra text accompanying note 39 for the text of section 702(a). 
62In re Lake States Commodities, 173 B.R. 642 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).  The court in Lake 
States Commodities reasoned that section 702(b) refers directly to creditors described in 
section 702(a).  Section 702(b) requires that the election be requested “by creditors that may 
vote under subsection (a).”  The Lake States finding that section 702(a)(1) requires that the 
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Debtor’s schedules.63  Since, however, the section 341 meeting commonly is held 
before the claims bar date, restricting the calculation to only those claims on file 
appears to be inconsistent with the policy of the section.64 
Creditors who attend the first meeting with the purpose of electing a trustee are 
frequently on an adversarial footing with the debtor.  Consequently, the debtor may 
have listed these claims as disputed65 on the schedule; and when a proof of claim is 
filed, the debtor may have responded with an objection.  When the debtor and 
creditor are in fundamental dispute about the merits of the claim, questions will arise 
as to whether the creditor should be counted in determining whether the twenty 
percent requirement of section 702(b) has been met.  In In re San Diego Symphony 
Orchestra,66 the creditors desiring to elect the trustee filed proofs of claim for 
wages.67  The schedules listed the claims as priority indebtedness, but there was 
agreement that a substantial amount of the claims were beyond the priority caps set 
forth in section 507(a)(3).68  The creditors filed a proof of claim and the interim 
trustee filed an objection.  The court was called upon to determine the applicable 
standard be applied to the claims for purposes of determining the universe of claims 
under section 702(b).69 
                                                          
creditor “hold a claim that is allowable,” that the creditor must comply with section 502 which 
generally governs allowability of claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  173 B.R. at 646.  The 
court seized upon section 502(a) which provides that “[a] claim or interest, proof of which is 
filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed . . . .”  11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1998).  
Thus, the court reasoned that unless a proof of claim had been filed, the creditor claim was not 
allowable within the meaning of section 702(a)(1).  Cf. In re Michelex, Ltd., 195 B.R. 993, 
1000 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996) (noting that section 502(a) employs the word “allowed,” but 
section 702(a)(1) uses the word “allowable,” and arguing that a difference must have been 
intended).  See supra text accompanying notes 75-80 for further discussion. 
63In re Michelex, Ltd., 195 B.R. 993 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996); In re Lindell Drop Forge, 
111 B.R. 137, 141 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990). 
64In re Tartan Construction Co., 4 B.R. 655, 658 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980).  The legislative 
history of section 702 appears to support the right to vote a claim even though the claim was 
not filed prior to the section 341 meeting.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 102-103 (1978).  See 
supra text accompanying note 34 for the text of the House Report. 
65In order for a creditor to request an election and vote for the trustee the claim must be 
“undisputed.”  See infra text accompanying notes 81-88 for further discussion of the 
“undisputed” requirement. 
66201 B.R. 978 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996). 
67Section 702 does not expressly exclude priority claimants from voting as was the case 
under prior law.  Priority claimants are nevertheless excluded from voting.  Section 702(a)(1) 
requires that the creditor own an “unsecured claim of a kind entitled to distribution under 
section 726(a)(2), 726(a)(3), 726(a)(4), 752(a), 766(h), or 766(i). . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 702(a)(1) 
(1984).  Priority claims are provided for in section 726(a)(1).  11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (1994).  
See supra text accompanying note 39 for the text of the section. 
6811 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1998) (limiting priority wage claims to $4000.00 per claimant). 
69201 B.R. at 980. 
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The court acknowledged that the filing of a proof of claim was prima facie 
evidence of its validity.70  When there was an objection, however, it appeared that the 
statutory criteria that the claim has to have been “undisputed” was not satisfied.71  
But the court was sympathetic to the creditors’ concern that the debtor or interim 
trustee could decide their ability to vote by filing a frivolous objection to the claim.72 
In arriving at the applicable standard, the court noted that section 303(b) limits 
creditors who wish to join in involuntary cases to those claims which are not subject 
to “a bona fide dispute.”73  The court observed that Congress did not include a “bona 
fide” limitation in section 702.  Thus, the court was tempted to conclude that any 
objection, even one that was not bona fide, could result in disqualifying the creditor 
from voting.74  The court, however, reluctantly embraced the bona fide dispute test in 
ruling whether the creditor was eligible to request an election:  “This Court 
concludes that the test is no more than the bona fide dispute assessment of § 303(b), 
and it may well be even less than that.”75 
Most bankruptcy courts will be reluctant to conduct mini-trials to determine 
whether a creditor is eligible to request an election.76  At one time the bankruptcy 
rules provided that a claim could be temporarily allowed only for purposes of 
voting.77  This provision was deleted by subsequent changes to the rule.78  One court 
ruled that this change was significant and refused to conduct an inquiry into the 
substance of the filed claim.79  But some level of inquiry needs to be conducted.80  
Relying exclusively on the schedules permits the debtor to prevent the election of a 
                                                                
70Id. at 982.  See also In re Michelex, Ltd., 195 B.R. 993, 1008 (Bankr. W. D. Mich. 1996) 
(“When a proper proof of claim is filed before, or at, the § 341 meeting, it supersedes the 
debtor’s schedules.”); In re Eddie Haggar Ltd, Inc., 190 B.R. 281, 286 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
1995). 
71Id. at 983. 
72Id. 
73Id. 
74201 B.R. at 983. 
75Id.  See also In re Centennial Textiles, Inc., 209 B.R. 31, 33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(“[I]t must appear that the dispute is grounded on more than a mere suspicion.”)  “An 
unsupported allegation of a dispute regarding a claim is insufficient to disqualify a creditor’s 
claim for qualifying a request for an election, or for voting.”  Id. at 34. 
76In re Lindell Drop Forge Co., 111 B.R. 137, 144 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990); In re Tartan 
Construction Co., 4 B.R. 655, 658 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980). 
77FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 207 (1976) (repealed 1983).  See infra note 108 for the text of 
former rule 207.  
78FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 2003(b)(3) (1983).  See infra note 108 for the text of Rule 
2003(b)(3). 
79In re Cohoes Industrial Terminal, Inc., 90 B.R. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).   
80The legislative history noted that the existing bankruptcy rules permitted “temporary 
allowance of claims, and will continue to do so for the purposes of determining who is eligible 
to vote under this provision.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 378-79 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 
92-93 (1978). 
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trustee by scheduling all unsecured claims as disputed.  Relying exclusively on the 
proofs of claim permits creditors who would otherwise not be eligible to demand an 
election to do so by filing a proof of claim on the morning of the section 341 
meeting.81  Thus, some investigation should be conducted to determine whether the 
schedules82 and proofs of claim were filed in good faith. 
b. Priority and Undersecured claims 
In determining the universe of claims from the schedules, schedule F, the 
schedule for unsecured claims, is obviously going to be consulted.  However, many 
creditors listed on schedule D, the schedule for secured creditors, hold both secured 
and unsecured claims because that creditor is undersecured.83  Section 507(a) 
contains caps of the amount of the priority claim of creditors.84  The excess is given 
only general priority status.  Courts have been called upon to determine whether the 
amount of the claim in excess of the priority caps should be treated as part of the 
universe.  Other courts have been required to determine whether the unsecured 
portion of the undersecured creditor’s claim should be part of the universe. 
In In re San Diego Symphony Orchestra,85 a bankruptcy court had to resolve an 
election dispute.  In determining whether twenty percent of the claims had duly 
requested an election, the court had to determine whether that portion of a wage-
priority claim which was above the $4000.00 priority cap should be treated as a 
general unsecured claim and therefore part of the universe.86  The court concluded 
that it should be counted and that the wage claimants should be entitled to be part of 
the twenty percent universe of creditors who could request an election.87 
                                                                
81Most section 341 meetings are held well within the claims bar date.  Thus, the creditor 
could file the proof of claim in such a way as to satisfy all of the statutory criteria on the eve 
of the section 341 meeting before the interim trustee has time to investigate the claim and 
object to it.   
82On rare occasions the schedules will not be available at the time of the section 341 
meeting.  For example, in Matter of Blanchard Management Corp., 10 B.R. 186 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1981), an involuntary petition was filed against the debtor and the debtor was 
uncooperative.  Id. at 188.  Schedules were never filed, but several creditors moved to elect a 
trustee at the first meeting.  Id.  The court ruled that there could be no election because it was 
not possible to determine whether the voted claims constituted twenty percent of the universe 
of claims.  Id.  The court stated that the creditors remedy was to utilize the procedures 
permitted by Bankruptcy Rule 2005.  Id.  See FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 2005 (1991).  That 
section permits the creditors to request the court to order the arrest of the debtor by the U.S. 
Marshall Service and bring the debtor before the court.  Id. at 186.  The court suggested that 
the creditors could subpoena the necessary records to piece together the debtor’s financial 
affairs.  Id. at 188. 
83See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1998), dividing the undersecured creditor’s claim into a secured 
claim and an unsecured claim. 
8411 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1994). 
85201 B.R. 978 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996). 
86Id. at 982. 
87Id. 
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The San Diego Symphony case was correctly decided.  In most cases, there is no 
policy basis for depriving these type of creditors of the right to request and then vote 
for a trustee.  In some cases, priority claimants where only part of the claim is 
entitled to priority should not be permitted to vote.  For example, a substantial 
portion of the claim may be entitled to priority and the assets of the estate may only 
be sufficient to pay priority claimants.  Such a creditor is unlikely to vote for a 
trustee who is committed to an extensive investigation of the debtor’s financial 
affairs, thereby creating an administrative expense which will be paid ahead of the 
creditor’s priority claim.  In that situation, however, the creditor should be prevented 
from voting the non-priority portion of the claim not because it holds a priority 
claim.  Rather the bar should be based on the grounds that the creditor interest is 
“materially adverse” to the interest of the general unsecured creditors and therefore 
disqualified under section 702(a).88 
Permitting the undersecured creditor’s unsecured claim to be part of the universe 
creates more difficulty.  In Matter of Lindell Drop Forge,89 the court decided that the 
undersecured creditor’s unsecured claim should not be included in the universe.90  In 
reaching this holding the court noted that the value of the collateral at the time of the 
first meeting will not have been set and therefore the bankruptcy court would not be 
able to ascertain with any degree of certainty whether the creditors truly held an 
unsecured claim.91  Only in cases where the secured creditor was willing to waive its 
secured claim should the creditor be entitled to request an election.92 
The Lindell Drop decision begs some questions.  Even though the value of 
collateral may not be capable of precise estimation, a range can usually be 
established in which a bankruptcy court can take some comfort in knowing the lower 
and upper limits.  If the collateral is valued at its upper limits and the creditor still 
holds an unsecured claim, the creditor should be permitted to vote the claim in that 
amount.  In some cases, for example claims secured by stock traded on a stock 
exchange, the claim is capable of valuation with great precision.  The mere fact that 
the claim is partially secured should not disqualify the creditor from requesting an 
election and voting its unsecured claim.  There would be adversity, however, only if 
the creditors’ paramount interest is protecting its security and it is anticipated that 
there would be some litigation regarding that security. 
A more compelling argument for not counting undersecured claims is that these 
claims are not liquidated.93  In some cases, it may be necessary to value the collateral 
                                                                
88See infra text at notes accompanying 150-175 for discussion of the “materially adverse” 
limitation. 
89111 B.R. 137 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990). 
90In re Michelex, Ltd., 195 B.R. 993, 1006-1007 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996). 
91Matter of Lindell Drop Forge, 111 B.R. at 145-46. 
92Id. at 146. 
93In re Centennial Textiles, Inc., 209 B.R. 31, 35-36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).  See infra 
text accompanying notes 115-128 discussing the requirement that the indebtedness must be 
liquidated and fixed. 
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for purposes of the valuation of the claim.  The unsecured creditor could be in a 
position “materially adverse” to that of the bankruptcy estate.94 
B.  Voting Eligibility– Section 702(a) 
Section 702(a) places limitations on the right of a creditor to request an election 
and vote.  Specifically, the claim must be “allowable,” “fixed,” “liquidated,” 
“unsecured,” the claimant must not “have an interest materially adverse” to the 
interests of the unsecured creditors, and the claimant must not be an “insider.”95  
These criteria are discussed separately below. 
1.  Subsection (a)(1) 
a.  Allowable 
Most courts look to section 502, which governs allowability of claims, and 
related sections to define “allowable” under section 702(a)(1).  For example, it seems 
clear that a creditor who has benefited from a avoidable preferential transfer will not 
be entitled to either request an election or vote in that election.  Section 502(d) of the 
Bankruptcy Code provides that the court shall disallow the claim unless the 
transferee who has received the preference has paid the trustee’s claim or returned 
the property to the estate.96  The creditor will also not be permitted to request an 
election and vote in that election.97  
One court ruled that in order for a claim to be “allowable” a proof of claim must 
have been filed.98  This court reasoned that section 502(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 
requires that a proof of claim be filed in order for the claim to be “allowed.”   
This view was criticized in In re Michelex, Ltd.99  The court noted that the 
definitions of “allowable” and “allowed” differed.100  ‘Allowable’ means 
‘PERMISSIBLE:  not forbidden not unlawful or improper.101  ‘Allow’ or ‘allowed’ 
                                                                
94Id. at 35.  See infra text accompanying notes 150-175 for further discussion of the 
“materially adverse” requirement. 
9511 U.S.C. § 702(a)(1)-(3) (1984).  See supra text accompanying note 39 for the text of 
the statute. 
9611 U.S.C. § 502(d) (1998).  
97In re Centennial Textiles, 209 B.R. at  33.  The creditor’s claim could also be found to be 
“materially adverse” to the interest of the other creditors and will be disqualified for that 
reason.  See infra text accompanying notes 150-175. 
98In re Lake States Commodities, Inc., 173 B.R. 642, 646 (Bankr. N. D. Ill. 1994).  See 
also In re DB Drilling, Inc., 73 B.R. 953, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1978) (“[A] claim should be 
allowed for voting purposes if it is in substantial compliance with the requirements of the 
Code and the Official Bankruptcy Forms; if the name and address of the creditor and the 
amount of its claim are substantially as shown in the schedules; and there is no objection to the 
allowance of the claim.” citing In re Flexible Conveyer Co., 156 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ohio 
1957). 
99195 B.R. 993, 999-1006 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996). 
100Id. at 1000. 
101Id. 
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means ‘to accept as true as true as represented: ADMIT, CONCEDE, 
ACKNOWLEDGE.”102  The court reasoned that the two words meant different 
things and only “allowable” was used in the statute.103  The court therefore declined 
to adopt section 502(a)’s requirement of a filed proof of claim in construing section 
702(a)(1).104  In addition, the court supported its holding by analyzing the legislative 
history which stressed creditor control of the process.105  The 1978 change 
promulgated a threshold requirement of twenty percent creditor participation.  It had 
been adopted so as to discourage frenzies among the creditors to get control of the 
estate.106  Since trustee elections are uncommon, a rule which looked only to filed 
proofs of claim as of the time of the first meeting would result in many instances in a 
single creditor obtaining control because its claim was the only one on file. 
The policy reasons advanced by the Michelex court are convincing.  A single 
creditor could take control in those frequent cases where the other creditors are 
unaware of their right to vote if only filed proof of claims were permitted to vote.  
The very reason for a twenty percent requirement is to frustrate the efforts of a single 
creditor or a small group of creditors who hold less than twenty percent of the claims 
which will be receiving a dividend to take over the bankruptcy administration.  
Therefore, the Michelex court was correct in rejecting the approach that only those 
creditors holding a filed proof of claim are entitled to vote and have their claims be 
determined as part of the universe of claims. 
b.  Undisputed 
The case of In re San Diego Symphony Orchestra, is discussed above.107  Recall 
that the courts have generally eschewed suggestions that the debtor’s designation on 
the schedules, the creditors’ proofs of claims, or even objections to proofs of claim 
as being conclusive.  Recall that in determining whether a claim is “undisputed” 
most courts have declined to conduct a mini-trial, but they do make an inquiry to 
determine whether the objection is frivolous. 
Bankruptcy Rule 2003(b)(3) previously permitted “temporary allowance” of a 
claim after “notice and hearing.”108  In 1991 this provision was deleted.  But one 
                                                                
102Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 58 (1986)). 
103Id. at 1000-1. 
104195 B.R. at 1000. 
105Id. at 1000-1. 
106Id. at 1001-1004.  The 20 percent requirement was promulgated “to ensure that a trustee 
is elected only in cases in which there is true creditor interest, and to discourage election of a 
trustee by attorneys for creditors.”  Id. at 1003, (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (1977)), 
reprinted in 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, Part II, p. 102.  See supra pp.12-13 for the full text of 
the House report. 
107See supra text accompanying notes 85-87. 
108FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 2003(b)(3) (1983) provides: 
 
Notwithstanding objection to the amount of allowability of a claim for the purpose of 
voting, the court may, after such notice and hearing as it may direct, temporarily allow 
it for purpose in an amount that seems proper to the court. 
Rule 2003 (b)(3) is based upon prior rule 207(a).  That provision provided: 
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court relied on this rule to permit the creditor to vote.109  The case had started as a 
Chapter 11 and had been converted to a Chapter 7.  The creditor’s claim had been 
“liquidated” by entry of an order in the Chapter 11.  At the time of conversion, the 
case was on appeal to the circuit court.  The court concluded that the claim should be 
permitted to vote in the amount established by the bankruptcy judge.110  This was 
true even though the matter was on appeal; the debtor had disputed the amount of the 
claim in its schedules, and was still disputing the claim on appeal.111 
The court in In re Centennial Textiles, Inc.112 reasoned that the withdrawal from 
the bankruptcy court of the ability to grant “temporary voting” privileges in 1991 
undercut the court’s ability to make significant inquiry into the amount or substance 
of the claim.  In Centennial, at the time of the section 341 meeting the interim trustee 
had filed a adversary complaint against the creditor seeking to avoid a preferential 
transfer.  The creditor conceded that it could not vote its total claim but sought to 
have at least part of it allowed.  The court refused to estimate on the claim for voting 
purposes.  Because of the amendment to Rule 2003(b)(3) the court felt that it lacked 
the authority to temporarily allow disputed claims for voting purposes.113 
We have previously expressed our views concerning the adoption of a rigid 
system based only upon schedules, proofs of claim, and/or objections to proofs of 
claim to determining voting privileges under section 702.114  The problem with 
complete reliance on either the schedules or the proofs of claim is that it gives too 
much discretion in parties who are clearly interested in deciding who gets to vote.  If 
reliance on the schedules became the norm, the debtor would be tempted to list as 
disputed claims for which there is no legitimate dispute.  If reliance on proofs of 
claim became the norm, a creditor could file a proof of claim on the very day of the 
section 341 meeting and control the election even though there may be some 
legitimate basis for disputing those claims.  Objections to proofs of claim can be 
every bit as frivolous as any other pleading.  In order to ensure fair elections, there 
must be some level of scrutiny by an independent fact-finder.  The authorities 
unanimously agree that a “mini-trial” to determine if a claim is “disputed” would 
unduly delay the administration of the estate at the initiation of the case.  However, 
the bankruptcy court should undertake some examination to determine whether the 
claimant is entitled to vote. 
                                                          
Except as hereinafter provided, a creditor is entitled to vote at a meeting if he has filed 
a proof of claim at or before the meeting, unless objection is made unless the proof of 
claim is insufficient on its face.  Notwithstanding objection to the amount or 
allowability of a claim for the purpose of voting, the court may temporarily allow it 
for that purpose in such amount as to the court seems proper. 
FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 207(A) (repealed 1983). 
109In re Cohoes Industrial Terminal, 90 B.R. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
110Id. at 69. 
111Id. at 69-70. 
112209 B.R. 31, 34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
113Id. at 33-34. 
114See supra text accompanying notes 50-61. 
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c.  Fixed 
The statute provides that a creditor’s claim must be “fixed” for the creditor to 
vote for the trustee.115  Few cases discuss “fixed” in the context of section 702.  In re 
Michelex, Ltd.116  relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Farrey v. 
Sanderfoot,117 and defined “fixed” as follows: 
‘Disputed’ and ‘unliquidated’ debts are to be designated on a debtor’s 
schedule.  However, claims not ‘fixed’ are not designated.  Rather, 
Schedule F requires that ‘contingent’ debts be designated.  ‘Fixed’ means 
to ‘fasten a liability upon. . . . If a debt is not ‘fixed’ the liability is not yet 
fastened.  “A claim is ‘fixed’ under § 702(a)(1) so long as it is not a 
‘contingent claim.”118  Therefore, those scheduled debts listed as 
‘contingent’ should be deleted as not ‘fixed.’119 
We have failed to discover one case that defines “fixed” in a meaningful manner 
other than the language offered by the Michelex court.  The legislative history offers 
no guidance.  We call for an amendment to the statute below.120  Under Michelex, a 
claim is “fixed” if it is not “contingent.”121 
d.  Liquidated 
A “creditor’s claim must be liquidated if the creditor wants to vote for the 
trustee.”122  Generally, a claim is liquidated if it is capable of precise dollar 
determination.123 
Few courts have struggled with the question of whether a claim which is partially 
liquidated and partially unliquidated satisfies the statutory criteria.  For example, in 
                                                                
11511 U.S.C. § 702(a)(1) (1984). 
116195 B.R. 993 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996). 
117500 U.S. 291 (1991). 
118Citing In re Klein, 110 B.R. 862, 871 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 
119 B.R. 971 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). 
119Id. at 1007, n. 32. 
120See infra text accompanying notes 283-300. 
121Creditors filing involuntary petitions must hold claims “not contingent as to liability.”  
11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1994).  Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define “contingent,” 
cases construing section 303(b)(1) generally conclude that contingent claims are claims where 
liability depends on the occurrence of some future event.  In re Duty Free Shops Corp., 6 B.R. 
38, 39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (“A contingent claim is one which may arise upon the 
occurrence of a future event.”); In re Longhorn 1979-II Drilling Program, 32 B.R. 923, 926-29 
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983). 
12211 U.S.C. § 702(a)(1) (1984). 
123The court in In re Centennial Textiles, Inc., 209 B.R. 31, 34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
defined the test as follows:  “A debt is liquidated within the meaning of section 702 if the 
amount due and the date on which it was due are fixed or certain, or when they are 
ascertainable by reference to:  (1) an agreement or (2) a simple formula.”  Citing In re 
Potenza, 75 B.R. 17, 19 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987); In re Poage, 92 B.R. 659, 665 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 1988). 
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In re Klein,124 the creditor, USF&G, filed a claim in excess of $30,000,000.00 for 
liability on a blanket surety bond.  There was no dispute that the claim was partially 
unliquidated because USF&G had a right to bring an action against third parties for 
part of the $30,000,000.00 which it had paid on the bond.  But the court was also 
able to identify at least $10,000,000.00 of the claim for which there was no right of 
action against a third party and which was liquidated.125  The court concluded that 
USF&G should be permitted to vote the claim to the extent of $10,000,000.00.126  In 
reaching this holding, the court rejected the reasoning of the creditors favoring the 
interim trustee that if any portion of the claim was not subject to liquidation then the 
creditor should be permitted to vote no portion of the claim.127  The court reasoned 
that if would be absurd to exclude a claim where $29,000,000.00 was liquidated and 
$1,000,000.00 was unliquidated.  Yet that would be the result of the logic of those 
creditors opposed to the elected trustee were embraced.128 
e.  Unsecured 
Creditors holding an unsecured claim are generally permitted to vote for the 
trustee.  The Bankruptcy Code divides the claim of a creditor holding an 
undersecured claim into two claims—a secured and an unsecured claim.129  A few 
courts have ruled on the issue of whether the undersecured creditor can vote the 
unsecured claim.130  Where the creditor has been asserting its secured interest in a 
manner which is detrimental to the best interests of the unsecured creditors, the 
courts have held that the creditor may not vote the claim.131 
We argued above that undersecured creditors should be permitted to divide their 
claim as permitted by section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code132 into a secured claim 
and unsecured claim.133  While the value of the collateral may not be subject to a 
precise valuation, the bankruptcy court should be permitted to affix the highest value 
in the possible range of values for the collateral and permit the creditor to vote the 
excess.  As we noted above, cases can occur where the interest of the undersecured 
creditor is materially adverse to the interests of the general unsecured creditors.  In 
those cases, the creditor should not be permitted to vote because of its failure to 
satisfy the “material adversity” requirement.134 
                                                                
124119 B.R. 971 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990), appeal dismissed, 940 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1991). 
125Id. 
126Id. 
127Id. at 981. 
128Id.  Where, however, the creditor’s claim is arguably fully secured by cross-guarantees, 
it seems clear that the claim is not liquidated within the meaning of section 702.  In re 
Centennial Textiles, Inc., 209 B.R. 31, 34-35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
129In re Barack, 201 B.R. 978 at 983-4. 
130Id. 
131In re Frederick Petroleum Corp., 92 B.R. 273, 275 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988). 
13211 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1978). 
133See supra text accompanying notes 83-95. 
134See infra text accompanying notes 150-175. 
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f.  Entitled to Distribution 
In order to vote a creditor must be “entitled to distribution under sections 
726(a)(2), 726(a)(3), 726(a)(4), 752(a), 766(h), or 766(i).”135  Section 726(a)(2) 
requires that claimants must have either filed a proof of claim or fit within the 
Bankruptcy Code’s exceptions to the proof of claim requirement.136  Section 
726(a)(3) provides that claimants who have filed tardy claims are entitled to a 
distribution after section 726(a)(2) claimants.137  Section 726(a)(4) permits 
distributions to creditors who holds claims which are the nature of a penalty.138  
Noticeably absent are section 726(a)(1) claims (claims for section 507 priority 
claims)139 and section 726(a)(5) claims for interest.140  Thus, creditors who hold 
                                                                
13511 U.S.C. § 702(a)(1) (1984).  See supra text accompanying note 39 for the complete 
text of the statute. 
136(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title 11 USCS property of the estate shall 
be distributed— 
*   *   * 
(2) second, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim, other than a claim of a kind 
specified in paragraph (1), (3), or (4) of this subsection, proof of which is--  
(A) timely filed under section 501(a) of this title;  
(B) timely filed under section 501(b) or 501(c) of this title or; or  
(C) tardily filed under section 501(a) of this title, if--  
(i) the creditor that holds such claim did not have notice or actual 
knowledge of the case in time for timely filing of a proof of such claim under 
section 501(a) of this title; and  
(ii) proof of such claim is filed in time to permit payment of such 
claim . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (1994). 
137(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be 
distributed— 
*   *   * 
(3) third, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim proof of which is tardily filed 
under section 501(a) of this title, other than a claim of the kind specified in paragraph 
(2)(C) of this subsection . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(3) (1994). 
138(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be 
distributed--  
*   *   * 
(4) fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for any 
fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages, arising 
before the earlier of the order for relief or the appointment of a trustee, to the extent 
that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not compensation for actual 
pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim. 
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1994). 
13911 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1994). 
140(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be 
distributed--  
*   *   * 
(5) fifth, in payment of interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the 
petition, on any claim paid under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection. 
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claims only for administrative expenses and creditors who hold claims only for 
interest expense are not permitted to vote.  
There are two views regarding the correct construction of the “entitled to a 
distribution” provision.  We discussed these cases above in regard to the “allowable” 
limitation.141  Their analysis also applies to this provision. 
In re Lake States Commodities, Inc.,142 concluded that a creditor was required to 
file a proof of claim to be a creditor “entitled to distribution.”  This conclusion 
flowed from the language of section 726.  The court reasoned that each of 726’s 
subsections incorporated into section 702 requires the filing of a proof of claim.143  
More significantly, the section requires that the creditor hold a claim which is 
“allowable.”144  A condition precedent for “allowability” is that the creditor file a 
proof of claim.145 
The court in In re Michelex Ltd.,146 disagreed with this approach.  The court noted 
that on some occasions even untimely claims are entitled to distribution under 
section 726.147  Further, section 702(a)(1) contemplates that creditors holding claims 
which filed after the first meeting are entitled to vote.  Thus, filing a proof of claim 
prior to the first meeting of creditors is not a condition precedent for voting.148 
We urge adoption of the Michelex analysis.  As that court noted, in rare cases 
creditors will receive a dividend even if their proofs of claim were untimely.149  The 
present statutory scheme calls for an early first meeting of creditors, a prompt 
selection of a trustee, and a more extended time period for filing proofs of claim.  
Congress was aware of this schedule when section 702 was enacted.  Section 702, by 
employing the terms “allowable” and “entitled to a distribution,” does suggests that 
filing a proof of claim is a condition of voting.  But other convincing reasons have 
been offered for use of that language.  The word “allowable” likely was chosen to 
affirm Congressional intent to permit only those claims which were legitimate and 
not subject to challenge.  It is likely that Section 702(a)(1)’s reliance on the 
distribution scheme set forth in section 726 was based on the desire to permit only 
general unsecured creditors to select the trustee.  Those creditors are the most 
dependent upon the trustee to maximize any recovery from the estate.  
                                                          
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (1994). 
141See supra text accompanying notes 96-106. 
142173 B.R. 642 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994). 
143Id. at 646. 
144See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 96-106. 
14511 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1999) provides: 
A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed 
allowed, unless a party in interest, including a creditor of a general partner in a 
partnership that is a debtor in a case under chapter 7 of this title, objects. 
146195 B.R. 993, 1001 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996). 
147Id. at 999; 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2)(C) (1998). 
148Accord In re Tartan Constr. Co., 4 B.R. 655 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980). 
149195 B.R. at 1001. 
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2.  Subsection (a)(2) 
a.  Materially Adverse 
The creditors must not be adverse to the interests of the unsecured creditors if 
they want to vote.150  If they hold a position adverse to the debtor, they may vote.151  
In In re DB Drilling, Inc.,152 the case was initially brought as an involuntary petition.  
Three of the five petitioning creditors voted for a trustee other than the interim 
trustee.153  Objection was made to these votes because those creditors were 
demonstrably hostile to the debtor.154  The court rejected the argument that these 
creditors held materially adverse claims, reasoning that the fact that the creditors’ 
had joined in the involuntary petition “can only be construed as favorable to the two 
dissenting creditors’ interests as unsecured creditors. . . .”155  While they were clearly 
adverse to the debtor, their interests were not in any way adverse to the interests of 
the unsecured creditors. 
Where the creditor has received a preference, that creditor holds a materially 
adverse claim.156  Therefore, the creditor may not request an election and may not 
                                                                
150Present section 702(a)(2) provides that a creditor may vote if the creditor “does not have 
an interest materially adverse, other than an equity interest that is not substantial in relation to 
a creditor’s interest as a creditor, to the interest of creditors entitled to such distribution.”  11 
U.S.C. § 702(a)(2) (1999) (emphasis added).  The italicized language was included by the 
Senate and adopted without change in the compromise bill.  S. 2266, 95th Cong. (1978); FED. 
R. BANKR. PROC. 702(a)(2); Compromise Bill, 124 CONG. REC. H11063 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 
1978). 
We have not discovered any definitive case law construction of this language.  One court 
reached the obvious conclusion, in dictum, that a shareholder who had “100% control” of the 
debtor-corporation should not be permitted to vote.  In re Oxborrow, 104 B.R. 356, 358 (E. D. 
Wash. 1989), aff’d on other grounds, 913 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1990).  The section offers no 
“bright-line” tests.  Instead, it calls for the court to analyze the creditor’s claim and determine 
whether the size of the claim in relation to the size of the creditor’s equity interest.  If the 
claim is predominate the creditor should be entitled to vote; if the equity interest dominates, 
the “creditor” should not vote.  The House Report suggests that the court balance “various 
factors” in determining material adversity: 
It requires a balancing of various factors, such as the nature of the adverse interest, the 
size of the adverse interest, the degree to which it is adverse, and so on.  Thus, a 
creditor with a very small equity position would not automatically be excluded from 
voting solely because he holds some equity position in the debtor. 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 378 (1977).  Balancing of factors will also be necessary to determine 
whether the creditor holds an insubstantial equity interest. 
151In re Blesi, 43 B.R. 45, 47 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). 
15273 B.R. 953 (Bankr. N. D. Tex. 1987). 
153Id. at 954. 
154Id. at 954-5. 
155Id. at 955. 
156In re Lang Cartage Corp., 20 B.R. 534, 536-37 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982). 
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vote.157  However, where the claim that the creditor received a preference is based on 
“mere suspicion,” the creditor will not be disqualified.158 
The claim must be “materially” adverse.  Where there is a dispute as to the 
amount of the claim, the claim is not materially adverse.159  A creditor may be 
successful in establishing a high value on its claim; therefore, the other creditors will 
receive less.160  This alone does not establish material adversity.161 
One court held that where the creditor had received an $11,000.00 post-petition 
transfer that the creditor was not disqualified.162  The creditor held a $265,000.00 
claim and the court was convinced that it was unlikely that the possibility of being 
forced to disgorge an $11,000.00 post-petition transfer would influence the creditor’s 
vote.163  The court did, however, reduce the voting amount of the claim by 
$11,000.00.164   An opposite result was reached by another bankruptcy court.165  In 
that case the creditor held a claim in excess of $2,300,000.00 but had allegedly 
received a $20,000.00 preference.  The court found that only the dollar amount of the 
preference claim was relevant.  The court reasoned that it was “more appropriate to 
determine the materiality of the adverse interest based solely on the dollar amount 
(of the preference), without comparison with other claims. . . .”166 
In the case of In re Klein,167 the district court affirmed the reasoning of the 
bankruptcy judge regarding “material adversity.”  The creditor, USF&G seeking to 
elect a trustee, held a claim against a third party.168  The bankruptcy estate also held a 
claim against that same third party.  If USF&G had been successful, then the third 
party’s liability to the bankruptcy estate would have been reduced by the amount of 
USF&G’s recovery.  The court reasoned that USF&G was adverse to the interest of 
the bankruptcy estate:  “Since USF&G has an incentive to recover from the 
adversary defendants directly rather than receive a diluted share of the adversary 
defendants’ assets from the estate, USF&G has an interest adverse to the estate.”169 
                                                                
157Id. at 536. 
158In re Metro Shippers, 63 B.R. 593, 599 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986). 
159In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc., 90 B.R. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
160Id. at 70. 
161Id.  
162In re Metro Shippers, 63 B.R. at 600. 
163This result appears to be consistent with the legislative history.  Both the House and 
Senate Reports conclude that a creditor who also holds “a very small equity position” should 
not be excluded from voting.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 378-79 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 
92-93 (1978).  See supra discussion at note 106. 
164See In re Metro Shippers, 63 B.R. at 599-600. 
165In re NNLC Corp., 96 B.R. 7 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989). 
166Id. at 10. 
167119 B.R. 971 (N.D. Ill. 1990), appeal dismissed, 940 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1991). 
168Id. at 975-76. 
169Id. at 976-77. 
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss3/6
1999] ELECTION OF CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES 395 
The court eventually ruled, however, that USF&G should have been entitled to 
vote.170  In holding in favor of USF&G, the court provided useful analysis regarding 
the time at which the adverse interest had to exist.  First, the court noted that 
transactions which had been “completed prior to the election” were not relevant in 
determining adversity.171  Since USF&G specifically agreed to “forgo” its adverse 
interest prior to the election, the court concluded that there no longer was any 
adversity.172  Finally, the court antedated the date at which the adversity could be 
removed to the time of hearing before the bankruptcy judge.173  The court reasoned 
that the creditor should be permitted to remove the adversity after the first meeting 
so as to discourage interim trustees from raising an objection to voting the claim at 
the first meeting.174  Discussions regarding the creditor’s right to vote and the 
creditor’s willingness to forgo any part of the claim so as to remove the adversity 
should be held prior to the first meeting.175 
The “material adversity” requirement is not capable of precise applicability.  
Instead, bankruptcy courts are instructed to make a determination of whether the 
creditor’s vote will be motivated by what would be in the best interest of the 
unsecured creditors as a group.  In most instances, creditors who have received 
preferences will not vote for a trustee who will aggressively pursue that claim.  But 
where the claim is an insignificant one viewed from the perspective of the creditor, it 
is unlikely that the potential preference action will influence the choice of a trustee.   
Under this view, the size of the potential claim against the creditor should not be 
compared with the size of the creditor’s claim against the estate.  The creditor may 
hold an unsecured claim which is twenty times greater than the preference action 
against it.  But the existence of the preference action may well be the primary 
motivating factor in that creditors vote for trustee.  The assets of the estate may be 
sufficient to pay less than five percent of the claims.  In that case, it would be to the 
creditor’s advantage to vote for a trustee who will not aggressively pursue that claim.  
The creditor would be well-advised to trade his claim against the estate for the 
preference claim back against the creditor. 
For these same reasons, creditors should be permitted to remove the adverse 
interest up to the time for hearing on the motion to resolve the election dispute.  
Creditors should be permitted to give an actual demonstration of their true interest by 
settling the preference action with the interim trustee to remove the adverse interest 
or by entering into an agreement to forgo pursuit of their own claims.  For this 
reason, we approve of the court’s reasoning in Klein. 
                                                                
170Id. at 982. 
171119 B.R. at 975. 
172Id. at 977. 
173Id. at 983. 
174Id. at 983-4. 
175Id. at 984. 
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3.  Subsection (a)(3)– Insiders. 
Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a detailed definition of 
“insiders.”176  Insiders may not vote in trustee elections.177  Generally speaking, 
insiders are deemed to be so closely connected to the debtor either by legal 
relationship or by family relationship that their vote would most likely be motivated 
by what is in the best interest of the debtor rather than what may be in the best 
interest of the unsecured creditors. 
The courts have not always limited themselves to the confines of the statute.  
This is justifiable in some instances because the statutory definition employs the 
word “includes,” suggesting that a less than literal construction was intended.178  
Instead, the relationships listed are illustrative and not exclusive.  For example, the 
debtor’s attorney is not on the list, but one court, properly prevented the attorney 
from voting an attorney’s fees claim.179 
In the Blesi case, discussed in the introduction,180 a single creditor, who was the 
debtor’s business partner, was permitted to elect the trustee.181  The court 
acknowledged that the creditor was a partner and therefore an insider, but concluded 
                                                                
176Insider includes-- 
(A) if the debtor is an individual-- 
(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor; 
(ii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iii) general partner of the debtor; or 
(iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control; 
(B) if the debtor is a corporation-- 
(i) director of the debtor; 
(ii) officer of the debtor; 
(iii) person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(v) general partner of the debtor; or 
(vi) relative of a general partner director officer or person in control of the 
debtor; 
(C) if the debtor is a partnership-- 
(i) general partner in the debtor; 
(ii) relative of a general partner in general partner of or person in control of the 
debtor; 
(iii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iv) general partner of the debtor; or 
(v) person in control of the debtor; 
(D) if the debtor is a municipality elected official of the debtor or relative of an elected 
official of the debtor; 
(E) affiliate or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor; and 
(F) managing agent of the debtor. 
11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1999). 
177In re Vermont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 20 B.R. 33 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982). 
178See In re Blesi, 43 B.R. at 45. 
179In re Montagna, 31 B.R. 10 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983). 
180See supra text accompanying notes 2 through 15. 
181Blesi, 43 B.R. at 48. 
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss3/6
1999] ELECTION OF CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES 397 
that the creditor was not an insider for purposes of section 702(a)(3).  “[T]he point of 
the insider definition is to invalidate the voting of a creditor who is so tied to or 
controlled by the Debtor as to in effect be an alter-ego of the Debtor.”182 
The argument adopted by the Blesi court was rejected by the court in In re Baton 
Rouge Marine Repair & Drydock, Inc.183  In that case the creditor was an insider of 
one of the debtor’s affiliates, thereby making the creditor an insider of the debtor.184  
The creditor argued that there was a history of “bad blood” between the debtor and 
the creditor.185  Therefore, the creditor was not “tainted” with bad motives and his 
interests and those of the debtor “divulged.”186  In rejecting the argument the court 
observed: 
The definition of “insider” is a mechanical test, with no statutory hint of 
authority to apply a discretionary exclusion related to complicity between 
the debtor and the party potentially to be classed as an insider.  The Court 
cannot ignore an explicit statutory test to apply a vague expression of 
Congressional intent.187 
Cases like Blesi and Bauton Rouge Marine should be viewed differently from a 
case where court expands the statutory definition to exclude a creditor closely 
connected to the debtor from voting.  As was pointed out above, by employing the 
word “includes,” Congress supplied a list which is non-exclusive.  But in Blesi a 
relationship specifically listed in the statute, partners, was found not be an insider 
relationship for purposes of section 702(a)(3). 
Although it seems clear that the judge in the Bauton Rouge Marine case would 
not be willing to accept any distinction, Blesi and Bauton Rouge Marine can be 
distinguished.  In Blesi, the insider had gone so far as to take judgment against the 
debtor.188  In Bauton Rouge Marine, there were only unspecified allegations of “bad 
blood.”189  If a court were inclined to stray from the literal language of the statute, 
objective evidence, such as entry of judgment or the initiation of a law suit, should 
be required.  Oral testimony about a history of bad blood can be too easily 
manufactured.   
Even if there is a well-document history of adversity between the debtor and the 
insider, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Bankruptcy Code should be construed 
literally.190  Only in cases where there is an ambiguity in the language of the statute 
has that court demonstrated a willingness to attempt to discern Congressional 
                                                                
182Id. at 47. 
18357 B.R. 19 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985). 
184See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(E) (1999), providing that “affiliates or insider of an affiliate 
were the debtor.” 
185In re Baton Rouge, 57 B.R. at 22. 
186Id. 
187Id. 
18843 B.R. at 46. 
18957 B.R. at 22. 
190United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989). 
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intent.191  The policy supporting the insider limitation is to prevent creditors who are 
alter egos of the debtor, and therefore adverse to the interests of the unsecured 
creditors, from voting.  In a few cases, insiders do not fit this description.  But 
section 702(a)(3) was not drafted to permit exceptions.  Therefore, insiders, 
regardless of their relationship with the debtor, should not be permitted to vote. 
IV.  ELECTION PROCEDURES. 
A.  Rule 2003 
The first meeting of creditors are governed by Bankruptcy Rule 2003.192  The rule 
mandates that the first meeting be held “no fewer than 20 and no more than 40 days 
                                                                
191Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 
1411 (1999). 
192Rule 2003 provides: 
Rule 2003.  Meeting of Creditors or Equity Security Holders  
(a) Date and place.  In a Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 11 reorganization case, the 
United States trustee shall call a meeting of creditors to be held no fewer than 20 and 
no more than 40 days after the order for relief.  In a Chapter 12 family farmer debt 
adjustment case, the United States trustee shall call a meeting of creditors to be held 
no fewer than 20 and no more than 35 days after the order for relief.  In a Chapter 13 
individual’s debt adjustment case, the United States trustee shall call a meeting of 
creditors to be held no fewer than 20 and no more than 50 days after the order for 
relief.  If there is an appeal from or a motion to vacate the order for relief, or if there is 
a motion to dismiss the case, the United States trustee may set a later date for the 
meeting.  The meeting may be held at a regular place for holding court or at any other 
place designated by the United States trustee within the district convenient for the 
parties in interest.  If the United States trustee designates a place for the meeting 
which is not regularly staffed by the United States trustee or an assistant who may 
preside at the meeting, the meeting may be held not more than 60 days after the order 
for relief.  
(b) Order of meeting.  
(1)  Meeting of creditors.  The United States trustee shall preside at the meeting of 
creditors.  The business of the meeting shall include the examination of the debtor 
under oath and, in a Chapter 7 Liquidation case, may include the election of a 
trustee or of a creditors’ committee.  The presiding officer shall have the authority 
to administer oaths.  
(2)  Meeting of equity security holders.  If the United States trustee convenes a 
meeting of equity security holders pursuant to § 341(b) of the Code, the United 
States trustee shall fix a date for the meeting and shall preside.  
(3)  Right to vote.  In a Chapter 7 Liquidation case, a creditor is entitled to vote at 
a meeting if, at or before the meeting, the creditor has filed a proof of claim or a 
writing setting forth facts evidencing a right to vote pursuant to § 702(a) of the 
Code unless objection is made to the claim or the proof of claim is insufficient on 
its face.  A creditor of a partnership may file a proof of claim or writing 
evidencing a right to vote for the trustee for the estate of a general partner 
notwithstanding that a trustee for the estate of the partnership has previously 
qualified. In the event of an objection to the amount or allowability of a claim for 
the purpose of voting, unless the court orders otherwise, the United States trustee 
shall tabulate the votes for each alternative presented by the dispute and, if 
resolution of such dispute is necessary to determine the result of the election, the 
tabulations for each alternative shall be reported to the court.  
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after the order for relief.”193  Where the debtor refused to file schedules and therefore 
the first meeting of creditors was delayed, an election held beyond the 40 days 
mandated by Rule 2003(a) will not be invalidated.194   
Trustee elections are governed by subsections (b)(1), (b)(3), and (d) of the rule.  
Subsection (b)(1) and (b)(3) provides: 
(b) Order of meeting.  
(1)  Meeting of creditors. The United States trustee shall preside at 
the meeting of creditors. The business of the meeting shall include 
the examination of the debtor under oath and, in a Chapter 7 
liquidation case, may include the election of a trustee or of a 
creditors’ committee.  The presiding officer shall have the authority 
to administer oaths.  
* * * 
(3)  Right to vote. In a Chapter 7 Liquidation case, a creditor is 
entitled to vote at a meeting if, at or before the meeting, the creditor 
has filed a proof of claim or a writing setting forth facts evidencing a 
right to vote pursuant to § 702(a) of the Code unless objection is 
made to the claim or the proof of claim is insufficient on its face. A 
                                                          
(c) Record of meeting.  Any examination under oath at the meeting of creditors held 
pursuant to § 341(a) of the Code shall be recorded verbatim by the United States 
trustee using electronic sound recording equipment or other means of recording, and 
such record shall be preserved by the United States trustee and available for public 
access until two years after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors.  Upon request 
of any entity, the United States trustee shall certify and provide a copy or transcript of 
such recording at the entity’s expense.  
(d) Report to the court.  The presiding officer shall transmit to the court the name and 
address of any person elected trustee or entity elected a member of a creditors’ 
committee.  If an election is disputed, the presiding officer shall promptly inform the 
court in writing that a dispute exists.  Pending disposition by the court of a disputed 
election for trustee, the interim trustee shall continue in office.  If no motion for the 
resolution of such election dispute is made to the court within 10 days after the date of 
the creditors’ meeting, the interim trustee shall serve as trustee in the case.  
(e) Adjournment.  The meeting may be adjourned from time to time by announcement 
at the meeting of the adjourned date and time without further written notice.  
(f) Special meetings.  The United States trustee may call a special meeting of creditors 
on request of a party in interest or on the United States trustee’s own initiative.  
(g) Final meeting.  If the United States trustee calls a final meeting of creditors in a 
case in which the net proceeds realized exceed $1,500, the clerk shall mail a summary 
of the trustee’s final account to the creditors with a notice of the meeting, together 
with a statement of the amount of the claims allowed.  The trustee shall attend the final 
meeting and shall, if requested, report on the administration of the estate.  
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003. 
193Id.  In cases where the bankruptcy court has entered an order requiring the joint 
administration of cases, FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b), the creditors are nevertheless entitled to 
elect their own trustee in both cases.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2009(b). 
194In re Metro Shippers, 63 B.R. at 599. 
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creditor of a partnership may file a proof of claim or writing 
evidencing a right to vote for the trustee for the estate of a general 
partner notwithstanding that a trustee for the estate of the partnership 
has previously qualified.  In the event of an objection to the amount 
or allowability of a claim for the purpose of voting, unless the court 
orders otherwise, the United States trustee shall tabulate the votes for 
each alternative presented by the dispute and, if resolution of such 
dispute is necessary to determine the result of the election, the 
tabulations for each alternative shall be reported to the court.195 
Subsection (b) provides that the United States trustee is to preside over Chapter 7 
trustee elections.196  Creditors who have filed a proof of claim “or a writing setting 
forth facts evidencing a right to vote” are permitted to vote.197  Subsection (d) also 
requires the United States Trustee file a report of the election to the bankruptcy 
court:  
(d) Report to the court.  The presiding officer shall transmit to the court 
the name and address of any person elected trustee or entity elected a 
member of a creditors’ committee. If an election is disputed, the presiding 
officer shall promptly inform the court in writing that a dispute exists. 
Pending disposition by the court of a disputed election for trustee, the 
interim trustee shall continue in office. If no motion for the resolution of 
such election dispute is made to the court within 10 days after the date of 
the creditors’ meeting, the interim trustee shall serve as trustee in the 
case.198  
Effective December 1, 1999, subsection (d) accords the creditors ten days from the 
date that the United States trustee issues the report of election to motion to resolve an 
election dispute.199  New subsection (d) provides: 
(1) Report of undisputed election. In a Chapter 7 case, if the election 
of a trustee or a member of a creditors’ committee is not disputed, the 
United States trustee shall promptly file a report of the election, including 
the name and address of the person or entity elected and a statement that 
the election is undisputed.  
(2) Disputed election. If the election is disputed, the United States 
trustee shall promptly file a report stating that the election is disputed, 
informing the court of the nature of the dispute, and listing the name and 
address of any candidate elected under any alternative presented by the 
                                                                
195FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(b)(1), (3). 
196The bankruptcy court does have supervisory authority over section 341 meetings even 
though the rule expressly gives authority to the United States Trustee.  United States Trustee 
v. Vance, 189 B.R. 386, 391 (W.D. Va. 1995) (holding that the bankruptcy judge has the 
authority to enter an order continuing a section 341 meeting). 
197FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(b)(3). 
198FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(d). 
199Id. 
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dispute. No later than the date on which the report is filed, the United 
States trustee shall mail a copy of the report to any party in interest that 
has made a request to receive a copy of the report. Pending disposition by 
the court of a disputed election for trustee, the interim trustee shall 
continue in office. Unless a motion for the resolution of the dispute is 
filed no later than 10 days after the United States trustee files a report of a 
disputed election for trustee, the interim trustee shall serve as trustee in 
the case.200  
The purpose of this change is to afford creditors supporting the elected trustee 
additional time to file a motion to resolve a disputed election.  Cases have occurred 
where the United States Trustee did not file a report under Rule 2003(d) in sufficient 
time for the creditors to file their Rule 2003(d) motion.201 
For purposes of trustee elections, objections to a proof of claim must be made on 
or before the first meeting of creditors or it is waived.  Furthermore, the objection 
cannot be a general objection, it must be made with sufficient particularity to “justify 
disallowance of a claim.”202 
Rule 2003(b)(3)’s requirement that the creditors must have filed a proof of claim 
or other written evidence to establish the bona fides of that claim should be 
reconsidered.  As presently drafted, trustees could be elected who do not enjoy the 
support of the majority of the creditors eligible to vote.203  Elections are unusual, 
with the standing trustee becoming the permanent trustee after the first meeting of 
creditors.204  The procedure delineated in Rule 2003(b)(3) permits a minority of 
creditors to “steal” an election.  This can be done by keeping their intentions to hold 
an election secret, filing proofs of claim the day of the section 341 meeting, and 
objecting to anyone voting who has not filed a proof of claim and who does not have 
writings which complies with the rule. 
B.  Voting By Proxy 
Bankruptcy Rule 2006 governs the solicitation of proxies, and therefore it covers 
proxy solicitation for trustee elections.205  A “proxy” is defined as “a written power 
                                                                
200Id. 
201See infra text accompanying notes 192-196 for further discussion. 
202In re Lake States Commodities, Inc., 173 B.R. 642, 647 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994), citing 4 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, & 702-11 (15th ed. 1994). 
203Recall that twenty percent of the unsecured creditors can call for an election with a 
majority of those voting electing the trustee.  See supra text accompanying notes 43-49. 
204215 11 U.S.C. § 702(d) (1994). 
205Rule 2006 provides: 
(a) Applicability. This rule applies only in a liquidation case pending under Chapter 7 
of the Code.  
(b) Definitions.  
(1)  Proxy. A proxy is a written power of attorney authorizing any entity to vote 
the claim or otherwise act as the owner’s attorney in fact in connection with the 
administration of the estate.  
(2)  Solicitation of proxy. The solicitation of a proxy is any communication, other 
than one from an attorney to a regular client who owns a claim or from an attorney 
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to the owner of a claim who has requested the attorney to represent the owner, by 
which a creditor is asked, directly or indirectly, to give a proxy after or in 
contemplation of the filing of a petition by or against the debtor.  
(c) Authorized solicitation.  
(1) A proxy may be solicited only by: (A) a creditor owning an allowable 
unsecured claim against the estate on the date of the filing of the petition; (B) a 
committee elected pursuant to § 705 of the Code; (C) a committee of creditors 
selected by a majority in number and amount of claims of creditors (i) whose 
claims are not contingent or unliquidated; (ii) who are not disqualified from voting 
under § 702(a) of the Code; and (iii) who were present or represented at a meeting 
of which all creditors having claims of over $500 or the 100 creditors having the 
largest claims had at least five days notice in writing and of which meeting written 
minutes were kept and are available reporting the names of the creditors present or 
represented and voting and the amounts of their claims; or (D) a bona fide trade or 
credit association, but such association may solicit only creditors who were its 
members or subscribers in good standing and had allowable unsecured claims on 
the date of the filing of the petition.  
(2) A proxy may be solicited only in writing.  
(d) Solicitation not authorized.  This rule does not permit solicitation (1) in any 
interest other than that of general creditors; (2) by or on behalf of any custodian; (3) 
by the interim trustee or by or on behalf of any entity not qualified to vote under 
§ 702(a) of the Code; (4) by or on behalf of an attorney at law; or (5) by or on behalf 
of a transferee of a claim for collection only.  
(e) Data required from holders of multiple proxies.  At any time before the voting 
commences at any meeting of creditors pursuant to § 341 of the Code, or at any other 
time as the court may direct, a holder of two or more proxies shall file and transmit to 
the United States trustee a verified list of the proxies to be voted and a verified 
statement of the pertinent facts and circumstances in connection with the execution 
and delivery of each proxy, including:  
(1) a copy of the solicitation;  
(2) identification of the solicitor, the forwarder, if the forwarder is neither the 
solicitor nor the owner of the claim, and the proxyholder, including their 
connections with the debtor and with each other. If the solicitor, forwarder, or 
proxyholder is an association, there shall also be included a statement that the 
creditors whose claims have been solicited and the creditors whose claims are to 
be voted were members or subscribers in good standing and had allowable 
unsecured claims on the date of the filing of the petition. If the solicitor, 
forwarder, or proxyholder is a committee of creditors, the statement shall also set 
forth the date and place the committee was organized, that the committee was 
organized in accordance with clause (B) or (C) of paragraph (c)(1) of this rule, the 
members of the committee, the amounts of their claims, when the claims were 
acquired, the amounts paid therefor, and the extent to which the claims of the 
committee members are secured or entitled to priority;  
(3) a statement that no consideration has been paid or promised by the proxyholder 
for the proxy;  
(4) a statement as to whether there is any agreement and, if so, the particulars 
thereof, between the proxyholder and any other entity for the payment of any 
consideration in connection with voting the proxy, or for the sharing of 
compensation with any entity, other than a member or regular associate of the 
proxyholder’s law firm, which may be allowed the trustee or any entity for 
services rendered in the case, or for the employment of any person as attorney, 
accountant, appraiser, auctioneer, or other employee for the estate;  
(5) if the proxy was solicited by an entity other than the proxyholder, or forwarded 
to the holder by an entity who is neither a solicitor of the proxy nor the owner of 
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of attorney authorizing any entity to vote the claim or otherwise act as the owner’s 
attorney in fact in connection with the administration of the estate.”206  The rule 
prohibits oral solicitations.207  The reader should note, however, that neither Rule 
2006 nor any other provision prohibits a party from encouraging a creditor qualified 
to vote to attend the first meeting and voting for a particular candidate. 
The rules do not prescribe that a particular form be followed in the proxy 
solicitation letter, and therefore the proxy will not be invalidated as long as the 
solicitation letter was not materially misleading.208  The proxy also does not have to 
specifically provide that the proxy holder has the authority to vote for the creditor in 
a particular trustee election.  Where there are multiple consolidated bankruptcies the 
proxy does not have to list each bankruptcy in order for the proxy holder to vote the 
claim.209 
The rule also places limitations on who may solicit proxies.  Rule 2006(c)(1) 
provides that proxies may be solicited only by: 1) a “creditor owning an allowable 
unsecured claim;” 2) a creditors’ committee section under section 705 of the 
Bankruptcy Code;210 3) a committee of creditors which meets the section 702 voting 
                                                          
the claim, a statement signed and verified by the solicitor or forwarder that no 
consideration has been paid or promised for the proxy, and whether there is any 
agreement, and, if so, the particulars thereof, between the solicitor or forwarder 
and any other entity for the payment of any consideration in connection with 
voting the proxy, or for sharing compensation with any entity, other than a 
member or regular associate of the solicitor’s or forwarder’s law firm which may 
be allowed the trustee or any entity for services rendered in the case, or for the 
employment of any person as attorney, accountant, appraiser, auctioneer, or other 
employee for the estate;  
(6) if the solicitor, forwarder, or proxyholder is a committee, a statement signed 
and verified by each member as to the amount and source of any consideration 
paid or to be paid to such member in connection with the case other than by way 
of dividend on the member’s claim.  
(f) Enforcement of restrictions on solicitation.  On motion of any party in interest or 
on its own initiative, the court may determine whether there has been a failure to 
comply with the provisions of this rule or any other impropriety in connection with the 
solicitation or voting of a proxy. After notice and a hearing the court may reject any 
proxy for cause, vacate any order entered in consequence of the voting of any proxy 
which should have been rejected, or take any other appropriate action.   
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2006. 
206FED. R. BANKR. P. 2006(b)(1). 
207FED. R. BANKR. P. 2006(c)(2) states that “[a] proxy may be solicited only in writing.”  
(emphasis added.)  By using the word “may,” the drafters did not implicitly authorize oral 
solicitations.  In re Eddie Haggar Ltd., Inc., 190 B.R. 281, 285-86 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995).  
The Haggar court ruled, however, that the rule was not violated when discussions were held 
about the potential election of a Chapter 7 trustee in a Chapter 11 creditors’ committee prior to 
the conversion to Chapter 7. 
208In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 214 B.R. 852, 861 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). 
209Id. at 861-62. 
21011 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1990) provides: 
At the meeting under section 341(a) of this title, creditors that may vote for a trustee 
under section 702(a) of this title may elect a committee of not fewer than three, and 
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requires; and 4) a “bona fide trade or creditor association” which solicits its own 
members.211  Where proxies are solicited by a duly constituted Chapter 11 
committee, which did not did not conform to Rule 2006(c)(1)’s requirements, the 
rule is violated.212  
Rule 2006(c)(2)(d)(4) specifically prevents proxy solicitation by attorneys.213  Of 
course, there is no prohibition against an attorney advising his own client how to 
legally solicit proxies.214  Moreover, the rule requires that parties voting “two or 
more proxies” file with the clerk of the court “a verified statement of the pertinent 
facts and circumstances” surrounding the solicitation.215   
Generally, a court will not invalidate an election for a single violation of rule 
2006.  Violations of the rule are likely to held to be harmless where the objection to 
voting the proxy comes from the interim trustee as opposed to a competing group of 
creditors.216  The court in In re Metro Shippers,217 held that an attorney’s violation of 
the rule should not result in negating the election.  The court emphasized that it held 
considerable discretion in enforcing the rule, that the errors were harmless, and that 
the court was convinced that the attorney had not acted in bad faith.218  Moreover, the 
court was concerned that the interim trustee did not enjoy the support of a majority 
of those creditors eligible to vote.219  The court in In re Brent Industries, Inc.,220 
however, refused to confirm the elected trustee for multiple violations of the rule. 
The proxy solicitation rule reflects an overriding concern about attorneys and/or 
an isolated group of creditors taking over a bankruptcy estate instead of deferring to  
                                                          
not more than 11, creditors, each of whom holds an allowable unsecured claim of a 
kind entitled to distribution under section 726(a) of this title. 
211FED. R. BANKR. P. 2006(c)(1).  See supra note 205 for the text of the rule. 
212In re Eddie Haggar Ltd., Inc., 190 B.R. at 286. 
213In re GIC Government Securities, 56 B.R. 105 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (attorney was 
also a creditor, but the letter of solicitation emphasized status as an attorney); In re Eddie 
Haggar Ltd, Inc., 190 B.R. at 285.  The rule’s prohibition is based upon the belief that 
solicitation by an attorney is unethical, FED. R. BANKR. P. 2006, Advisory Committee’s Note 
(citing In re Darland Co., 184 F. Supp. 760, 763-64 (S.D. Iowa 1960)), and that it would 
encourage unwanted attorney control over the election of trustees.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2006(d). 
214In re Eddie Haggar Ltd, Inc., 190 B.R. at 284. 
215FED. R. BANKR. P. 2006(e).  See In re Eddie Haggar Ltd, Inc., at 286 (holding that 
failure to file an acknowledged or notarized proxy in violation of FED. R. BANKR. P. 9010(c) 
required the court to reject the vote.  The court, however, ruled that the error had been waived 
because the violation had not be raised during the election and that the error was harmless 
because amended proxies in compliance with Rule 9010(c) were subsequently filed.). 
216In re Radford Enterprises, Inc., 31 B.R. 213 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (construing 
former rule 208 which governed solicitation of proxies). 
21763 B.R. 593, 599 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986). 
218Id. at 598-99. 
219We argue below that the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to give the bankruptcy 
discretion to order a new election.  See infra text accompanying notes 283-300. 
22096 B.R. 193 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989). 
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congressional legislative intent like the bankruptcy courts.  The Advisory Committee 
Notes to Rule 2006 stress that the courts are to exercise their discretion in arriving at 
results consistent with the policy objectives of the Bankruptcy Code and the 
concomitant rules.221  In doing this, the bankruptcy courts must necessarily make an 
independent assessment of whether elections dominated by proxy voting accurately 
reflects the creditors’ wishes. 
V.  REVIEW 
There have been a surprising number of cases resolving procedural issues 
attendant to review of trustee elections.  Discussed below is Rule 2003(d)’s 
requirement that a motion to resolve an election dispute must be filed in ten days of 
the first meeting.  The burden it places on the creditors favoring the elected trustee 
has spawned significant litigation.222  While several parties are interested in the 
outcome of trustee elections, it seems clear that only the creditors who voted either 
for or against the election winner have standing to contend that the election did not 
comply with applicable law.223  Once the bankruptcy judge enters an order resolving 
the election dispute, the law is unsettled as to whether an appeal can be taken.224  The 
courts are divided as to whether an order resolving an election dispute can be 
appealed either as a final or even a collateral order. 
A.  By the Bankruptcy Judge 
1.  Ten Day Requirement 
Rule 2003(d) requires the United States Trustee to “promptly” file a report of the 
disputed election.  The rule further provides that an aggrieved party must file a 
motion to resolve the dispute within ten days.225  “If no motion for the resolution of 
such election dispute is made to the court within 10 days after the date of the 
creditors’ meeting, the interim trustee shall serve as trustee in the case.”226  Rule 
2003(d) requires parties who have standing and who supported the elected trustee to 
file a motion within ten days of the “creditors’ meeting.”  Most courts construe the 
ten day limitation as “jurisdictional” and is not subject to enlargement.227 
Thus, a motion filed within ten days of receipt of the United States Trustee’s 
report has been viewed as untimely and the appeal will be dismissed.228  The appeal 
will be dismissed even though the creditor voting for someone other than the interim 
                                                                
221Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2006, Advisory Committee’s notes, subdivision (f) (“Courts have 
been accorded a wide range of discretion in the handling of disputes involving proxies.”). 
222See infra text accompaying notes 225-234. 
223See infra text accompaying notes 235-247. 
224See infra text accompaying notes 248-282. 
225FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(d)(2). 
226FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(d). 
227Rule 9006(b)(2) specifically excludes Rule 2003(d) from the court’s ability to enlarge 
time.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(2). 
228FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(d). 
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trustee was told by the United States Trustee that he should be able to file his motion 
within ten days of receipt of the report.229  As discussed above, Bankruptcy Rule 
2003(d) has been amended, effective December 1, 1999, to give parties supporting 
the elected trustee ten days from the day the United States trustee files the 2003(d) 
report to file their motion to resolve the disputed election. 
A majority of judges of a bankruptcy appellate panel ruled that Rule 2003(d)’s 
ten day limitation was in violation of the Rules Enabling Act230 and found the 
limitation period invalid.231  The court reasoned that an individual who met the 
statutory criteria was in fact trustee from the moment of the election.  By providing 
that the election could be overturned by failure to file a motion within ten days, the 
rule constituted “an invalid attempt to invalidate an election under Section 702.”232  
The court suggested that the rule be amended to require the bankruptcy court to 
schedule the matter for hearing upon receiving a notice from the United States 
Trustee.233 
In addition, the court found that the rule violated the Rules Enabling Act by “(1) 
impermissibly shift[ing] the burden to the creditors who voted for the trustee to bring 
the dispute to the court’s attention despite [the] belief that the election was valid . . . 
and (2) provide[ing] unreasonably short time frame in which to file the motion to 
resolve an election dispute.”234 
Rule 2003(d) does demonstrate a hostility to the election of the trustee which is 
inconsistent with expressed Congressional philosophy of creditor control of the 
administration of the estate.  An individual may meet the section 702 qualifications 
but will not be permitted to serve.  A technical objection to the election can be 
raised, and the burden of filing a motion to resolve the election falls upon those 
creditors who have voted for the trustee.  Failure to file the motion within ten days 
will result in voiding the election.  As drafted, the rule demonstrates a hostility to 
elections which is inconsistent with the policy of creditor control of the estate. 
2.  Standing 
As collateral administrative matters, trustee elections create standing questions.  
Debtors should not enjoy standing to appeal an order confirming a trustee,235 nor 
should creditors who did not participate in the election.236  There seems to be little 
                                                                
229In re Carla Leather, Inc. 50 B.R. 764, 769-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Cf. In re National Sugar 
Ref. Co., 39 B.R. 578, 581 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
23028 U.S.C. § 2075 (1998).  That section precludes court-enacted rules that “shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 
231In re American Eagle Mfg., Inc. 231 B.R. 320, 332 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999). 
232Id. at 332. 
233Id. at 331-2. 
234Id.  
235In re Weston, 18 F.3d 860, 863-64 (4th Cir. 1994) (debtors do not have standing to 
appeal because they are not “persons aggrieved” by the outcome of the election). 
236Id. at 864.  A creditor which did not participate in an election is not aggrieved by its 
results.  But see In re American Eagle Mfg. Inc., 231 B.R. 320, 328-29 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999). 
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doubt that creditors voting in the election have standing to challenge the result.237  
Most courts hold that the interim trustee has standing.238  One court reached this 
conclusion and reasoned that the interim trustee has an expectation of receiving fees 
and commissions which would be frustrated by the trustee’s removal.239  This 
reasoning was rejected by another court which held that a candidate for an election 
lacked standing.  That court argued that until he was elected the candidate and his 
election confirmed he had no right to commissions.   
Suprisingly, most courts hold that the trustee-candidate lacks standing.240  One 
court did hold that the trustee candidate had a sufficient interest due to an economic 
interest in potential commissions.241  Another court ruled that such an interest was 
too remote and speculative.  The candidate, himself, has “no interest to be affected 
by the underlying bankruptcy case.”242  
Recall that the Blesi court ruled that the debtor had standing to object to the 
election.243  That court noted that the advisory note to Bankruptcy Rule 2003 stated 
that the bankruptcy court should resolve election disputes “when an interested party 
presents the dispute to the court.”244  The court reasoned that the debtor should be 
considered to be an interested party because creditor participation at 341 meetings is 
typically low and the debtor had the “most information” regarding claim holders.245 
Although unexpressed in the cases, there appears to be an underlying concern 
about the fairness of the election which affects the courts rulings on standing.  
Where, for example, there has been substantial creditor participation in the election 
at the first meeting there appears to be little justification for according standing to the 
                                                                
237In re Sandhurst Sec., Inc., 96 B.R. 451, 454 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
238In re Metro Shippers, 63 B.R. at 593, 598 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982) (suggesting that the 
expectation that the interim trustee would earn commissions gave the interim trustee standing 
as a matter of due process).  But see In re GIC Government Sec., Inc., 56 B.R. 105, 108 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). 
239In re Metro Shippers, Inc., 63 B.R. at 598. 
240In re Sandhurst Sec., Inc., 96 B.R. 451, 454 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), relying upon In re 
Grossman, 225 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).  See also, In re G.I.C. Gov’t Sec., Inc., 56 
B.R. at 105. 
241In re Metro Shippers, Inc., 63 B.R. at 593. 
242In re Sandhurst Sec., Inc., 96 B.R. at 454.  The Sandhurst decision also relied upon the 
old case of In re Grossman, 225 F. Supp. at 1020, (held that a candidate lacked standing.).  
Sandhurst concluded that if Congress intended to overrule Grossman it had a duty to makes its 
“intent specific.” 96 B.R. at 455 (quoting Midlantic Natl. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envt’l 
Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986), reh’g denied 475 U.S. 1090 (1986).  However, in In re 
American Eagle Mfg., Inc., 231 B.R. at 329, the court distinguished the Sandhurst case on the 
basis that the bankruptcy court had confirmed the election of the elected trustee who was 
defending his election on appeal.  At that point the elected trustee had been confirmed as 
permanent trustee, had filed suit against an insider of the debtor, and had incurred substantial 
fees. 
243In re Blesi, 43 B.R. at 48. 
244FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003 (Advisory Committee Notes). 
24543 B.R. at 48. 
37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
408 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:371 
United States Trustee, the interim trustee, the elected trustee, and especially the 
debtor.  Blesi’s holding was premised on the court’s belief that creditor participation 
at the first meeting of creditors was typically low.  
Where, however, the call for an election comes as a surprise and creditors are 
seeking to vote claims filed shortly before the first meeting, creditors opposed to the 
elected trustee may not have even attended the meeting.  In those situations, someone 
should be permitted to appear at the motion to resolve the disputed election and 
make an argument opposing the election.  In our view, both the United States trustee 
and the interim trustee should have standing in these surprise election cases.  But 
even in surprise elections, we cannot find any justification in the cases for giving the 
debtor standing.  If neither the United States trustee nor the interim trustee choose to 
contest the election before the bankruptcy court, it is highly doubtful that the 
debtor’s arguments will be anything but self-serving. 
Although the candidate-trustee is clearly interested in having his election 
confirmed, in most instances he would not have standing.  Before the election is 
confirmed the candidate-trustee has no economic interest in the case.246  If the 
creditors nominating and voting for him choose not to file their motion to resolve the 
election before the bankruptcy court, the trustee’s decision to press ahead with the 
matter suggests that attorneys or other professionals desire to control the bankruptcy 
case.247  This, of course, is precisely what Congress wanted to avoid when it enacted 
section 702. 
B.  Appeals 
1.  Standard of Review 
Few cases reviewing trustee elections under section 702 provide analysis 
supporting their standard of review.  As in other cases, conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo and findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.248  Where the 
issue was whether the motion to resolve an election was timely filed, one court 
reviewed the matter de novo.249  However, another court held the bankruptcy court’s 
calculations as whether section 702(b)’s twenty percent requirement was met would 
be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard.250  In most cases, section 702(b) 
calculations are made based on a written record.  In those cases, a de novo review is 
more appropriate. 
                                                                
246In cases where the trustee has been administering the estate and has incurred expense, 
then the trustee has standing. 
247FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(d). 
248In re Oxborrow, 104 B.R. 356, 360 (Bank. E.D. Wash. 1989), aff’d, 913 F.2d 751 (9th 
Cir. 1990). 
249In re Conco Bldg. Supplies, Inc., 102 B.R. 190, 191 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989). 
250In re Oxborrow, 913 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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2.  Appealable Orders 
In In re Martech USA, Inc.251 the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition, but the case 
was converted to Chapter 7.  Debtor’s creditors appeared at the first meeting of 
creditors and voted for Joseph Pardo as the trustee.  The bankruptcy court refused to 
appoint Pardo because he was a New York resident and did not have an office in 
Alaska, the place of filing.252  The creditors appealed.253 
The United States Trustee joined those creditors who voted against Pardo in 
resisting the appeal.254  They argued that appellate jurisdiction did not exist because 
the order denying Pardo’s election and appointing the standing trustee was not 
final.255  The court held that the order was final, thereby deciding the case on its 
merits.256  The court reasoned as follows: 
Orders that determine and affect substantive rights and have the potential 
to cause irreparable harm to the losing party are immediately appealable 
so long as they finally determine the discrete issue to which they are 
addressed.  Chapter 7 trustees play an important role in bankruptcy cases, 
making numerous decisions which under the mootness doctrine cannot be 
undone by an appellate court ruling.  A trustee’s actions on behalf of the 
estate should be supported with the certainty that the trustee’s capacity to 
so act is valid.  Forcing the Appellants to wait to the end of the 
bankruptcy case to appeal an important decision made at the beginning of 
the case would cause irreparable harm.  The order resolving the election 
dispute should be considered final since it conclusively determined a 
discrete issue.257 
The court also ruled that even if the order was not final, that it would treat the 
notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal and grant the motion.258 
The Seventh Circuit in In re Klein,259 took an opposite position.  In that case the 
bankruptcy court refused to confirm the elected trustee, instead entering an order 
confirming the interim trustee.  An appeal was taken to the district court, which 
reversed, confirming the original election.260  The Seventh Circuit declined to get to 
the merits of the election, instead ruling that it lacked appellate jurisdiction. 
                                                                
251188 B.R. 847 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995), aff’d mem., 90 F.3d 408 (9th Cir. 1996).  See also 
In re Oxborrow, 913 F.2d at 751. 
252Id. at 849. 
253The court ruled that those creditors who had voted for Pardo had standing to appeal.  Id. 
at 850. 
254Id. at 849. 
255Id. at 849. 
256188 B.R. at 850. 
257Id. at 849-50 (citations omitted). 
258Id. at 850. 
259940 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1991). 
260The district court’s opinion is discussed at text accompanying notes 167-175. 
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First, the court ruled that the order confirming the elected trustee was not 
“final.”261  The order did not resolve any “substantive rights.”262  The trustee election 
merely resolved “one procedural question along the way.”263 
The court also refused to find jurisdiction by treating the case as a “collateral 
order.”264  As a collateral order, the issue must meet the following criteria:  “The 
order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue 
completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.”265  The court noted that the second and third prongs 
overlapped with the test being whether the appellant would potentially suffer an 
“irreparable harm” if there was no review.266  In ruling that the collateral order 
doctrine was not satisfied, the court concluded the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller267 controlled.268 
The Koller court declined to review as a collateral order the ruling of the district 
court disqualifying an attorney.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that a review of 
the disqualification after the conclusion of the merits of the litigation may create 
additional litigation expense.269  But this was insufficient to permit an interlocutory 
appeal.270   The Seventh Circuit had previously permitted an attorney to appeal his 
court appointment as counsel in a case.271  The attorney protested his appointment 
because he feared that he would receive no reimbursement for his services.272  In 
Conticommodity Services, Inc. v. Ragan,273 the court ruled that the conclusion of the 
merits of the suit would make “moot” the argument the attorney wished to advance 
on appeal. 
Unlike the Ragan decision, the Klein court stressed that the interim trustee’s 
actions were the subject of “the surveillance of the bankruptcy judge.”274  In addition, 
the “interim trustee possesses no such interest which is both distinct and needful of 
immediate review.”275 
                                                                
26128 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1999).  See also, In re New York Produce American & Korean 
Auction Corp., No. 89-C8550, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11459 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1990). 
262940 F.2d at 1077. 
263Id. 
264Id. at 1078.  See also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
265940 F.2d at 1078 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). 
266Id. 
267472 U.S. 424 (1985) 
268940 F.2d at 1077. 
269472 U.S. at 430. 
270Id. at 436. 
271826 F.2d at 603. 
272Id. at 601. 
273Id. at 600, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1987). 
274In re Klein, 940 F.2d at 1078. 
275Id.  
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The court’s concern about mootness is well-justified in trustee election cases.  
The trustee elections are statements of preference for a particular individual to 
control the bankruptcy case.  Bankruptcy trustees are accorded significant discretion 
in  administering the case.  Thus, the sale of estate assets will not be avoided even if 
it is established that there were aspects to the sale which were erroneous.276  Most 
bankruptcy courts accord the trustee considerable discretion regarding decisions to 
initiate litigation, the valuation of assets, and to settle litigation.277  If an appeal could 
only be taken from an issue regarding a trustee election at the time the estate is 
closed, there would be nothing left to be done. 
Virtually every decision of significance has been made prior to the entry of the 
final order closing the bankruptcy case.278  In fact, the case cannot be closed until all 
of the assets of the estate have either been abandoned or liquidated.279  A reversal of 
the bankruptcy court’s decision either confirming or denying confirmation of the 
election of a trustee will accomplish nothing. 
Therefore, all three prongs of the collateral order test are met.  First, the order 
either confirming or denying the election does “conclusively determine the disputed 
question.”280  Second, the order does “resolve an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action.”281  Third, if the losing party is required to wait until 
the estate is closed to appeal, the order is “effectively unreviewable on appeal.”282 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
After exploring the cases and legislative history, we offer some recommendations 
for changes to section 702 and the supporting rules and sections.  Some of these 
suggestions are “house-keeping” changes; others call for a fundamental change from 
present law. 
Section 702(b) presently provides that “creditors may elect one person to serve as 
trustee . . . .”283  We recommend that section 702(b) be amended to provide that a 
                                                                
276Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a “reversal or modification on 
appeal” of an order approving the sale of real estate does not affect the “validity of a sale or 
lease” to parties acting in “good faith.”  11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (1999).  See, e.g., In re Edwards, 
962 F.2d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 1992). 
277Rule 6009 permits the trustee to commence or defend litigation without court approval.  
FED. R. BANKR. P. 6009 (1983).  The courts have interpreted this rule to give the trustee 
considerable discretion in litigation matters.  Sandra Cotton, Inc. v. Bank of New York, 87 
B.R. 272, 274 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).  The trustee is accorded wide discretion in the administration 
of estate assets.  In re Siegel, 204 B.R. 6, 9 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996). 
278Our research has failed to discover one core where the appeal come after the assets of 
the case were fully administered. 
27911 U.S.C. § 350(a) (1984). 
280In re Martech USA, Inc. 188 B.R. 847, 849-50 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) aff’d mem., 90 
F.3d 408 (9th Cir. 1996). 
281Id. 
282Id. 
28311 U.S.C. § 702(b) (1984).  See supra text accompanying note 39 for the text of the 
section. 
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“creditor may elect one person to serve as trustee. . . .”  This amendment will resolve 
the issue of whether an single creditor can satisfy section 702(b)’s twenty percent 
requirement.  Under section 102(7) of the Bankruptcy Code, “the singular includes 
the plural.”284  Therefore, the proposed amendment will not change present law that 
more than one creditor can effect an election.  While amended section 702(b) will 
read “creditor,” section 102(7) mandates that this includes “creditors.” 
Present section 702(a) requires that the creditor’s claim be “undisputed.”  This 
limitation has created problems because it is unclear whether the dispute has to be 
bona fide or whether the objection to the claim can be frivolous.  We recommend 
that section 702(a)(1) be amended to provide that the claim cannot be subject to a 
“bona fide dispute.”  The advantage to this proposal is that it prevents the debtor 
from being able to affect the outcome of the election by making frivolous objections 
to proofs of claim or by checking the “disputed” box on the bankruptcy schedules.  
The proposed amendment would have the additional advantage or permitting the 
courts to rely on that body of case law defining the identical language under section 
303(b)(1), which governs involuntary petitions.285  Because the phrase “bona fide 
dispute” is incapable of precision, bankruptcy judges will be required to conduct 
summary investigations of the merits of the claim. 
Section 702(a)(1) requires that the creditor’s claim be “fixed.”  The Bankruptcy 
Code does not define this term, nor could we discover an independent definition in 
the cases.  The Michelex court concluded that a fixed claim was one that was non-
contingent.286  Under section 303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, creditors filing 
involuntary petitions must hold claims which are “not contingent.”287   Cases 
construing that section hold that a contingent claim is one where liability depends on 
the occurrence of some future event.288  We recommend that section 702(a)(1) be 
amended to substitute “not contingent” for “fixed.”  This amendment will enable the 
courts to rely on that body of case law that has developed under section 303. 
Section 702(a) requires that creditors voting for the trustee hold an unsecured 
claim.  Under section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, undersecured creditors hold 
both a secured and an unsecured claim.289  It would seem to be axiomatic that 
undersecured creditors should be able to vote their unsecured claim.  Some courts 
have failed to make this distinction and therefore have denied the franchise to the 
undersecured creditor.  We therefore recommend that section 702(a) be amended to 
specifically provide that the creditor must “hold an . . . . unsecured claim (whether 
under section 506(a) of title 11 or otherwise). . . .”  As we note above, in some 
instances the undersecured creditor should be disqualified because it holds an interest 
which is “materially adverse” to the interest of the unsecured creditors.  The 
undersecured creditor should not be disqualified, however, merely because it holds a 
secured claim. 
                                                                
28411 U.S.C. § 102(7) (1978). 
28511 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1994). 
286See supra text accompanying notes 90-92 
28711 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1994). 
288See supra note 121. 
28911 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1978). 
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We recommend that the section 702(a)(3) be deleted.  Recall that that provision 
excludes insiders from voting.290  Those cases which permit insiders to vote where 
the record reveals that the insider is demonstrably in an adversary position with the 
debtor correctly discern the policy supporting the present exclusion for insiders.  
Insiders are excluded because there is a concern that those votes would reflect what 
is in the best interest of the debtor as opposed to the unsecured creditors.  But the 
Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the Bankruptcy Code is to be construed 
literally.291  Given this directive there is no discretion for the bankruptcy court to 
permit an insider to vote no matter what the record may reveal with regard to the 
insider’s relationship with the debtor. 
By deleting the exclusion for insiders, insiders will be permitted to vote in some 
cases.  In most cases, however, the insider interest’s will be materially adverse to the 
interests of the unsecured creditors.  The insider will be disqualified under section 
702(a)(2).  Insiders presumptively hold materially adverse interests to the unsecured 
creditors, but they should be permitted to establish that in the particular case they do 
not hold an adverse interest. 
The cases generally assume that the interim trustee will become the permanent 
trustee if the bankruptcy court refuses to confirm the election of the creditors’ 
candidate.  In many instances, making the interim trustee the permanent trustee is the 
only acceptable result from entry of an order refusing to confirm the election.  For 
example, if the bankruptcy court were to rule that the creditors seeking an election 
did not meet the twenty percent test mandated by section 702(b), the creditors should 
not be permitted to seek more votes in a new election.  Cases do occur, however, 
where a new election should be ordered.  If the bankruptcy court rules that the 
candidate cannot be confirmed because the candidate cannot meet the statutory 
qualifications for trustee,292 the creditors should be given the opportunity to elect 
another trustee.  A new election should also be available if votes were discarded 
because the proxy rules were violated.  Those creditors should not be deprived of the 
right to vote because a third party violated the proxy solicitation rules.293 
Much of the judicial concern with trustee elections seems to be directed at what 
we have labeled “surprise elections.”  The form giving creditors notice of the 
bankruptcy and the first meeting of creditors, does not inform the creditors that an 
election may occur.294  Because trustee elections are atypical, amending the form will 
not cause the creditors to prepare for an election which is unlikely to occur.  We 
recommend that section 702(d) be amended to require creditors who will be seeking 
an election to file a notice of that intent with the clerk of the bankruptcy court no less 
than fifteen days prior to the first meeting.295   The clerk should then be required to 
                                                                
290See supra text accompanying notes 176-191. 
291See e.g. Nobleman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); United States v. 
Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235 (1989). 
292See supra note 35. 
293Where the bankruptcy judge has ordered a new election, interlocutory appeals should 
not be permitted.  See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 248-282. 
294Form 9, Official Bankruptcy Forms.  
295If the notice of the first meeting was not sent in time for the creditors to file the notice, a 
second meeting to conduct the election should be held. 
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send this notice to the creditors and other parties in interest.  Because the creditors 
have the right to elect a trustee by statute, the creditors should not bear the expense 
of serving the notice.  In large cases, of more than 250 creditors for example, the 
notice could be sent to the largest twenty creditors as reflected on the debtor’s 
bankruptcy schedules. 
The notice of intent to elect a trustee serves the interests of the creditors, who 
will have the opportunity to prepare for an election.  It serves the interests of the 
courts because the court can be assured that those creditors who wanted to participate 
were given a meaningful opportunity to do so.  It will frustrate the attempts of the 
minority of creditors and/or their attorneys to steal the election.296 
Finally, we recommend that section 158(a) of the judicial code be amended to 
permit interlocutory appeals to the district court in trustee election cases.297  
Providing a statutory right to appeal has been done in other situations.  The section 
presently permits an interlocutory appeal in cases where the bankruptcy court has 
entered an order under section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code298 reducing or 
increasing the time to file a chapter 11 plan.  This amendment was overruled in In re 
Klein,299 at least insofar as appeals to the district court are concerned.  As we argued 
above, the result in Klein effectively makes trustee election decisions 
unreviewable.300 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Congress has permitted unsecured creditors to elect their bankruptcy trustee for 
over a century.  The 1898 act was drafted in such a manner that it presumed that 
most trustees would be elected, with the court appointing the trustee in the unusual 
case where there was no election.  In reality, most trustees were selected by the 
court.  Although the legislative history does not cite to specific examples, surprise 
elections by a minority of creditors occurred in enough cases that Congress imposed 
a twenty percent requirement on those calling for an election.   
                                                                
296In addition, under the notice procedure, only the creditors should have standing to 
challenge or support the election in further legal proceedings.  As was discussed above, see 
supra text accompanying notes 235-247, we believe that in some cases standing was given to 
the debtor, the interim trustee, and the United States Trustee because of concerns that creditors 
who were interested in the election did not participate because of lack of notice. 
297Section 158(a)(2) provides: 
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals 
*   *   * 
from interlocutory orders and decrees issued under section 1121(d) of title 11 
increasing or reducing the time periods referred to in section 1121 of such title. 
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994). 
298Section 1121(d) provides: 
On request of a party in interest made within the respective periods specified in 
subsections (b) and (c) of this section and after notice and hearing, the court may for 
cause reduce or increase the 120-day period or the 180-day period referred to in this 
section. 
11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1978). 
299940 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1991). 
300See supra text accompanying notes 259-266. 
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By legislating against the abuse by attorneys taking over control of the estate, 
Congress may have signaled to the courts and the rules drafters a hostility to 
elections which we do not belief exists or was intended.  Perhaps the greatest 
manifestation of this hostility is Rule 2003(d)’s ten day requirement.  Even though 
the recent amendment has softened its impact, duly elected trustees can be deprived 
of office because an arguably disinterested party, the interim trustee for example, 
makes an arguably frivolous, technical objection to the election.  The election is now 
under dispute, and the creditors will have the burden of filing their motion within ten 
days of the United States Trustee’s report. 
Also troubling, is the prospect that duly-elected trustees may be mooted out of 
office if the courts embrace the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in In re Klein.  If 
interlocutory appeals cannot be taken, the bankruptcy judge’s interpretation of 
section 702 will be unreviewable. 
In suggesting amendments to section 702, the supporting rules, and the statutes 
providing for appeals, we believe that we have struck the appropriate balance.  The 
suggested changes promote true creditor control of the bankruptcy case, while at the 
same time discouraging those parties opposed to the election process in general from 
prevailing on the basis of technicalities. 
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